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Abstract 
The terms and conditions of trade in the Norwegian grocery market are claimed to differ 
substantially between the market participants at retail level. Also, the cost of goods sold 
constitutes the most significant part of the total costs of the firms. Consequently, the terms 
and conditions of trade that a market participant is able to obtain are considered to have 
significant impact on its competitiveness. Building on the statements of Ica that their terms 
and conditions are substantially worse than those of its competitors and that without 
improvements they would have to withdraw from the market, this paper aims at understanding 
how terms and conditions of trade influence competitiveness at retail level in the Norwegian 
grocery market. Coop’s recent acquisition of Ica increases the relevance of the research. The 
research question is answered using a theoretical basis of vertical restraints and buyer power 
applied on a case study of the Norwegian grocery market with regards to terms and conditions 
of trade used in the market.  
 
The main findings of the paper are that differences in terms and conditions of trade to a 
certain extent make it difficult for market participants to compete. However, the paper 
concludes that there are also other factors that affect competitiveness. The conclusions are 
drawn based on a margin analysis conducted for all four market participants. The analysis 
shows that Ica has worsened its terms and conditions of trade over the investigated time 
period, which have made it harder for them to compete. However, Reitangruppen is also 
found to experience a worsening of its terms and conditions of trade but the firm has still 
improved its profitability and competitiveness.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
On October 6, 2014 Ica Gruppen AB announced the sale of its Norwegian grocery retail 
activities to the competitor Coop Norge Handel AS. Ica Norge’s (hereafter: Ica) market share 
has been falling since 1998 and the retailer has been experiencing operating losses since 2008. 
The firm has claimed that without better purchasing terms and a more efficient distribution 
they would have to withdraw from the market (Ica, 2013). Relative to NorgesGruppen, which 
is recognized as the participant with the best terms (Ministry of Agriculture and Food, 2011), 
Ica claims their terms and conditions to be 4-5% worse (Kristiansen, 2013; Strömberg, 2014). 
Another statement supporting differences in the participants’ terms and conditions is that of 
Coop’s CEO, which claims that Coop will achieve better terms and conditions due to the 
acquisition. Coop further expects the agreement with Ica to lead to increased bargaining 
power (Fanebust, 2014), which in turn is expected to lead to better terms and conditions of 
trade. Since cost of goods sold constitutes the major part of grocery retailers’ total costs, the 
terms and conditions that Ica, Coop or any other retailer is able to obtain, will have a 
significant impact on its relative competitiveness. 
 
Drawing on the statements of Ica and Coop and the importance of terms and conditions, the 
aim of this paper is to consider how terms and conditions of trade in the Norwegian grocery 
market affect the competitiveness of firms at retail level, i.e. how the terms and conditions 
that the market participants are able to obtain influence the profitability of the individual 
participant as well as their relative profitability on the horizontal level.  
1.2 Background 
In recent years, several reports have been conducted that investigate the situation in the 
Norwegian grocery market. Findings from the reports suggest an extensive use of vertical 
restraints, which are defined as contractual obligations imposed on the suppliers (Clarke, 
Davis, Dobson & Waterson, 2002). These restraints include listing charges, slotting 
allowances, contributions to promotions and different discounts and are important elements in 
the negotiations of terms and conditions of trade (Ministry of Agriculture and Food, 2011). 
The increasing use of buyer-imposed vertical restraints in negotiations can to a certain degree 
stem from the power shift from suppliers to retailers. Generally, there is an opinion among 
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suppliers that the umbrella chains1 exploit them by forcing them to offer unreasonable 
discounts and bonuses (Ministry of Agriculture and Food, 2011). Up until 1985 suppliers 
mainly dictated which products the small and independent retailers would carry. However, 
since the early 1990s retailers have evolved into major chains and in 2013 the four umbrella 
chains dominated the market, with a market share of 96% (Nielsen, 2014). The umbrella 
chains have integrated vertically into wholesale operations and today only a few products are 
distributed separately. The chains have also vertically integrated with a number of suppliers.  
 
Based on the findings of its 2011 report, the Inquiry Commission for the Power Relations in 
the Food Supply Chain (referred to as: the Food Chain Committee) proposed a new act 
relating to negotiations and fair trading practices in the grocery industry, where several 
different vertical restraints are suggested regulated (Ministry of Agriculture of Food, 2011). 
The association Grocery Manufacturers of Norway2 (DLF) has also expressed the need for 
new legislation regulating negotiations and securing fair play between suppliers and retailers 
by restraining the unreasonable behavior that the suppliers experience (Hasselgård, 2012). 
These propositions suggest that the vertical restraints employed in the Norwegian grocery 
market are possibly distorting competition and can have severe consequences for welfare. 
1.3 Research Purpose 
Drawing on the conducted reports, suppliers’ concerns and the market participants’ claims 
about the differences in terms and conditions of trade, my research question is as follows:  
 
How do terms and conditions of trade influence competitiveness at retail level in the 
Norwegian grocery market? 
 
Based on this research question, a thorough analysis will be performed of how price as well as 
other terms and conditions affect competitiveness. The results will be based on an analysis of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 An umbrella chain is a retailer operating with several retail formats (chains) collected under one brand name. 
(Finne & Sivonen, 2009).  
2 Dagligvareleverandørenes Forening (DLF) (Grocery Manufacturers of Norway) is a non-profit trade 
association with 105 members. Membership is not granted to manufacturers or suppliers that are owned by 
retailers or wholesalers. Additionally, members must mainly produce national brands. DLF’s members cover 
more than 95% of the grocery turnover in the Norwegian market (www.dlf.no) 
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the market participants’ gross and operating margins. To answer the research question, the 
following supporting research questions will be applied:  
 
(1) What characterizes competition at retail level in the Norwegian grocery market? 
(2) Which terms and conditions are used in the Norwegian grocery market? 
 
Lastly, as a consequence of Coop’s recent acquisition of Ica and the statement of how it 
affects terms and conditions of trade, the size of the participants is highly relevant. Following 
an approval from the Competition Authority the number of market participants will be 
reduced from four to three, but their market shares will be more evenly distributed. The 
consequences of size will be considered with help of theory regarding buyer power, 
answering the following question: 
 
(3) Does size influence the buyer power of retailers and how does relative size affects        
competitiveness? 
 
The main goals of the paper are to: (1) describe the current situation in the Norwegian grocery 
market in relation to competition, (2) identify and analyze the main factors influencing terms 
and conditions of trade (the vertical restraints employed), (3) assess the economic impact of 
terms and conditions of trade on participants at the retail level, i.e. their competitiveness and 
(4) explore possible benefits of size in the market and how this affects terms and conditions of 
trade. The paper does not aim at investigating the possible impact on consumer welfare; 
however, it is inevitable to touch upon the impact on end-user prices, as this is an important 
determinant of the competition. 
 
To understand the competitiveness at retail level in the Norwegian grocery market, it is 
important to gain a thorough understanding of the market structure and rivalry amongst the 
market participants. Furthermore, it is necessary to gain knowledge of which factors that are 
important in the competition, as well as what determines customer demand. 
 
The empirical foundation is based on the investigation conducted by the Food Chain 
Committee and other publications before and following their report. Also, investigations from 
the UK, Sweden and Australia are drawn upon in the paper to gain further insight into the use 
of vertical restraints and implications of buyer power. The theoretical foundation is found in 
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literature on vertical restraints and buyer power. The findings will be supported by 
profitability margins based on the financial statements of the four dominant participants in the 
Norwegian grocery market.  
1.4 Outline Structure 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Sections 2.1 and 2.2 reviews relevant 
literature and theory that help analyze the research questions. This includes literature on 
vertical restraints and buyer power. Section 2.3 presents the concept of competitiveness and 
section 2.4 briefly presents theory on market structure. 
 
In section 3, the case object – the Norwegian grocery market – and its participants are 
presented. The development of the market up until today, in addition to customer preferences 
and suppliers are also presented.  
 
Section 4 presents the methodology applied. Section 5 presents the data obtained from the 
umbrella chains’ financial reports as well as pricing information used to isolate the effects of 
prices on the margins. Furthermore, the section contains a discussion about the availability of 
information and the implications for this paper. 
 
Section 6 contains the analysis of the grocery market with regards to terms and conditions of 
trade. First, the terms and conditions of trade used in the market are identified and it is 
analyzed how these different vertical restraints are expected to influence the firm based on 
theoretical propositions. The latter is then supported by what we can actually observe in the 
Norwegian market through a margin analysis in section 6.2. Section 6.3 considers the concept 
of buyer power and how this influences the competitiveness of retailers. Section 7 provides a 
conclusion of the findings and the paper’s implications, as well as limitations and suggestions 
for further research. 
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2 Theory and Literature Review 
Section 2 will present theory and literature about terms and conditions of trade, retail buyer 
power, competitiveness and market structure. Section 2.1 presents the types of contracts that 
we can observe in the market and the use of different vertical restraints. The section contains 
literature on those terms and conditions of trade typically applied in the grocery industry, their 
meaning and which factors that affect them. Section 2.2 presents theory on buyer power and a 
theoretical framework for analyzing buyer power. Lastly, competitiveness is defined and a 
consideration of how to measure competitiveness is presented in section 2.3 and theory about 
market structure is presented in section 2.4 
2.1 Terms and Conditions of Trade 
2.1.1 Types of Contracts 
The basic terms and conditions of trade negotiated in a contract are price and quantity and 
possible discounts relating to these two factors. With discounts, the contract is typically 
linear. However, a linear contract will seldom be efficient. Compared to the optimal solution 
for supplier and retailer combined, linear contracts will cause lower volumes and higher end-
user prices as these contracts cannot serve both as a profit-maximizing and a profit-sharing 
mechanism. This is known as the double marginalization problem and is illustrated in figure 
2.1 below. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Double marginalization (Hjelmeng & Sørgard, 2013). 
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The supplier is faced with a marginal cost of zero and will therefore wish to sell the quantity 
where its marginal revenue equals zero. In figure 2.1 this is chosen as the price w and the 
supplier wishes to sell Q**. The retailer will however choose the quantity Q* where its 
marginal cost (w) equals marginal revenue (the dashed line). Consequently, the retailer will 
buy a lower quantity than what is optimal for the supplier, i.e. the retailer does not take into 
consideration the profit of the supplier when making its pricing decision. Therefore, the 
supplier‘s profit is reduced equal to the dark grey area in the figure. The profit of the retailer 
is given by the light grey area. The loss of profit by the supplier is however larger than the 
profit of the retailer, thus, the contract is not optimal for either party (Hjelmeng & Sørgard, 
2013). Flexible contracts allow the introduction of vertical restraints, contributing to solving 
this problem (Gabrielsen, Steen, Sørgard & Vagstad, 2013). 
2.1.2 Vertical Restraints 
Vertical restraints are contractual obligations regulating buying and selling between retailer 
and supplier. The restraints are used when it is possible to exercise some extent of vertical 
control in the supply chain. If a party is able to exercise vertical control of some sort over 
other parties, it is plausible that the party has some bargaining power (Gabrielsen, 2010). In 
the grocery market vertical restraints are typically buyer imposed indicating that retailers have 
bargaining power over suppliers (Clarke et al., 2002).  
 
Vertical control can be characterized along a continuum ranging from vertical separation to 
vertical integration. Vertical integration is the strongest force, where the integrative has full 
control over an integrated unit through ownership. Looser types of vertical control are often 
characterized as either price restraints or non-price restraints.  
 
Figure 2.2. Control in the vertical supply chain. 
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A contract including vertical restraints consists of more than the linear price (Hjelmeng & 
Sørgard, 2013). In a two-part tariff, the selling price from suppliers of grocery products with 
the introduction of vertical restraints is given as: 
 w ∗ Q− F , 
 
where w is the listing price from supplier including any discounts, Q is the quantity purchased 
and F is the vertical restraint as a fixed payment determined irrespective of quantity. The 
wholesale price w equals the marginal cost of the supplier and will induce the retailer to set 
the optimal end-customer price from the supplier side. The vertical restraint is the profit-
sharing element in the relationship between supplier and retailer,  
 
Examples of vertical restraints normally applied in the grocery industry are joint marketing, 
listing charges and (threats of) delisting, slotting allowances, retroactive discounts on goods 
sold, contribution to promotional expenses, below-cost selling, sale-or-return conditions and 
long payment terms. Their meaning is presented below in section 2.1.3. 
Impact on Competition 
The approaches to vertical restraints’ impact on competition are twofold, divided between the 
efficiency arguments and the competition dampening arguments (Gabrielsen, 2010). Bork and 
the Chicago school of thought represent the first. This school of thought claims that all 
vertical restraints are used to ensure efficiency in the supply chain and should therefore not be 
regulated. The effect on the competition is achieved as the restraints remove pricing 
distortions, optimize investment decisions and eliminate certain transaction costs (Dobson, 
Waterson & Chu, 1998). 
 
The concerns of the competition-dampening block are that the vertical restraints will cause 
entry barriers in the market, facilitate collusion and restrict interbrand and/or intrabrand 
competition (Dobson & Waterson, 1996). The interbrand competition concerns the 
substitution effects among brands and is connected to tying agreements and exclusive dealing 
and thus affects competition between suppliers selling different brands. The intrabrand 
competition concerns the substitution effects with regards to price or non-price factors 
between retailers selling the same brand, i.e. that it affects the way the products are distributed 
(lower prices versus offering services such as a better location, parking facilities, opening 
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hours, expertise etc.) (OECD, 1993; Hovenkamp, 2005). The welfare effects of vertical 
restraints will not be analyzed in this paper, however, the restraints’ impact on the intrabrand 
competition is important.  
 
A retailer will benefit when it gets the best possible agreement for itself but similarly benefits 
when retailers buying the same brand must pay more (Hovenkamp, 2005). According to 
Hovenkamp (2005, p. 185) “restraints imposed on manufacturers by powerful dealers or 
dealers’ groups are more likely to be anticompetitive.” However, vertical restraints can also 
be regarded as pro-competitive, i.e. promotes competition in the market place (Hovenkamp, 
2005). Consequently, the assessment of the use of vertical restraints requires consideration of 
both competition dampening and efficiency enhancing elements. 
2.1.3 Non-Price Vertical Restraints 
Joint Marketing 
Acting as a supplier of space, retailers may charge a promotional support fee in return for in-
store advertising. Joint marketing is defined as the shared marketing efforts between supplier 
and retailer, where the retailer is responsible for the execution of the marketing efforts. The 
joint marketing fee is considered a cooperation bonus from suppliers to retailers (Gabrielsen, 
2010).  
 
The Chicago school of thought’s argument for using joint marketing fees is to reach an 
optimal level of marketing efforts. Due to the free rider problem this level is considered 
unattainable when the two parties invest in marketing efforts separately. 
 
However, joint marketing transfers the risks of the marketing effects from retailer to supplier, 
allowing the retailer to raise income at the expense of suppliers (Dobson, 2005). Joint 
marketing is mainly criticized for being a profit transfer between supplier and retailer, as the 
actual use of the fee is hard to detect and it has been considered a way of hiding bonus 
transfers (Ministry of Agriculture and Food, 2011). 
Slotting Allowances 
Foros and Kind (2008, p. 367) define slotting allowances as “fees paid by manufacturers to 
get access to retailers’ shelf space”. Shelf space is considered a scarce resource and a slotting 
allowance is a mean to allocate the resource (Dobson et al., 1998). Slotting allowances differ 
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from discounts, as they are upfront (“rental”) fees rather than retroactive discounts based on 
volume purchased (Shaffer, 1991). In the Norwegian grocery market slotting allowances are 
considered a part of the joint marketing arrangements (Dulsrud & Beckstrøm, 2005). 
 
The Chicago school of thought emphasizes the use of slotting allowances as a screening 
device to signal the supplier’s seriousness, quality and belief in the product’s success. 
Suppliers will not be willing to pay the fee unless the information they have about the product 
shows that the product is good enough and will likely be a success. Consequently, the slotting 
allowance reduces asymmetric information between retailer and supplier. Additionally, 
slotting allowances can be understood as a mechanism to share the costs and risks of new 
product introductions (Dulsrud & Beckstrøm, 2005).  
 
The competition school of thought considers slotting allowances as competition dampening 
through the increase of wholesale price that must be transferred to increased end-user prices, 
also inducing competitors to raise their prices. Additionally, the slotting allowance can be 
employed to increase market power. The concern is that in the long run, smaller suppliers will 
be excluded from the market since it is only used as a pressure point to obtain better 
agreements with larger suppliers. This approach does not take into consideration the 
preferences of customers but solely the attempts to increase profit (Dulsrud & Beckstrøm, 
2005). 
 
In Shaffer’s model of slotting allowances (1991), two firms sell homogenous products but 
they are differentiated due to differences in customers’ store preferences. Consequently, 
differences in retail prices will not cause the demand of the higher-priced firm to fall to zero.  
In Shaffer’s model (1991) two firms compete at retail level with profit functions given as: 
 
Profit 1 = (P1 – w1)(a – P1 + bP2) + S1 
 
Profit 2 = (P2 – w2)(a – P2 + bP1) + S2 , 
 
where P1 and P2 are the end-consumer prices charged by chain 1 and chain 2 respectively, w1 
and w2  is the wholesale prices offered from the supplier and S1 and S2 are the lump-sum 
payments representing the respectively charged slotting allowances of the chains. (a – P1 + 
bP2) is the demand function of chain 1 and (a – P2 + bP1) is the demand function of chain 2. 
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In its easiest form the model is played out with the suppliers announcing their terms (unit 
wholesale price and the slotting allowance), the retailer chooses which supplier to buy from 
based on price (take-it-or-leave-it contract without any cooperation with other retailers). As 
long as suppliers are operating with a profit greater than or equal to zero, the use of slotting 
allowances must be outweighed by a higher retail price (Shaffer, 1991). The effect is 
illustrated in figure 2.3, where chain 1 imposes a slotting allowance on the supplier. This 
increases w1, which in turn will raise P1 and induce chain 2 to raise P2 as well, but with less 
that P1. 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Slotting allowances used only by chain 1 (Foros, 2014). 
 
The increased wholesale price will soften competition at retail level, as an increased 
wholesale price is transferred directly to an increase in end-user prices to achieve profit 
maximization. This gives a positive effect on competitors’ sales, as some customers will shift 
to their stores. In equilibrium, all retailers will use slotting allowances. Consequently, all 
firms will raise their prices, as illustrated in figure 2.4. 
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Figure 2.4. Slotting allowances used by both chains (Foros, 2014). 
 
Shaffer (1991) assumes that end-customer prices are set based on marginal cost. Also, the 
contracts must be observable and irreversible. Are these latter assumptions not satisfied, 
Shaffer expects that no slotting allowances will be employed due to there being no strategic 
effects to gain from the use of the fee. 
Other Vertical Restraints 
Other vertical restraints may also be present in the grocery industry, giving a retailer the 
possibility to improve its terms and conditions. Listing charges are fees suppliers must pay 
before the retailer will accept the supplier and eventually buy products from their range. 
Delisting, or the threat of such, is removing suppliers from the acceptance list. Long payment 
terms is a way to obtain free loans by deliberately not pay invoices by due date. Below-cost 
selling refers to selling products below the purchase price to increase store traffic. This type 
of restraint may alter the customers’ perception of product value and distort sales forecasts, 
harming suppliers. Retrospective discounts are monetary terms paid by supplier to retailer at 
year-end, calculated on the basis of sales value during the year. Sales-or-return discounts are 
the possibility a retailer has to get a refund of expenses by returning products not sold during 
a period. This type of restraint will not only cause the supplier to bear the risk of products not 
being sold but could dampen the retailers incentives of selling the particular products (Clarke 
et al., 2002). 
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2.2 Retail Buyer Power 
Clarke et al. (2002, p. 2) define retailer buyer power as “the ability of leading retail firms to 
obtain from suppliers more favorable terms than those available to other buyers, or which 
would otherwise be expected under normal competitive conditions.” This definition may be 
further enhanced by the proposed definition of the Secretariat of OECD (1998, para. 20): “[A] 
retailer is defined to have buyer power if, in relation to at least one supplier, it can credibly 
threaten to impose a long term opportunity cost which, were the threat carried out, would be 
significantly disproportionate to any resulting long term opportunity cost to itself”. 
Consequently, retail buyer power arises from buying economies and is concerned about 
relative economic dependency. 
 
According to Dobson (2005) if a large retailer loses a product line it may account for 1-3% 
percent of its sales, whereas the supplier’s loss of the retailer would be around ten times that 
level. Consequently, the supplier is relatively more dependent on the retailer. It is important to 
bear in mind that Dobson’s article is based on the grocery market in the UK, where grocery 
stores typically carry more product lines than what is the case in the Norwegian market. Still, 
the Norwegian market is much more concentrated than the UK market. 
 
Buyer power is affected at both retail level and upstream level. Buyer power of retailers will 
decrease with the number of suppliers in the market, but increase with retailers’ relative size 
to the supplier (Clarke et al., 2002). Additionally, Dobson (2005) emphasizes the skewed 
relative economic dependency of retailers and suppliers due to the retailers’ roles as not only 
customers, but also as suppliers and competitors in the supply chain. A retailer is a supplier as 
it offers shelf space and advertising space, using means such as slotting allowances or 
requiring promotional support. A retailer is a competitor if it offers private label products that 
compete for this limited space, hence additionally operating as gatekeeper. The Food Chain 
Committee in its report (2011) also pointed to the multiple roles of the retailer, questioning 
the impact this has on competition. 
2.2.1 Approaches to Retail Buyer Power 
According to Gabrielsen et al. (2013) buyer power can be approached in two ways, either 
through the monopsony model or through the bargaining model. The monopsony model is 
based on a market with only one downstream retailer but several upstream suppliers. The 
retailer is also the only seller in the end-consumer market, hence enjoys monopsony power. 
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Monopsony power allows practice of demand withholding, allowing the retailer to obtain 
more favorable purchasing terms and increase end-user prices, both factors contributing to 
increased margins. The model is illustrated in figure 2.5. 
 
Figure 2.5. Monopsony model (Gabrielsen et al., 2013). 
In the monopsony model suppliers are powerless and retailers determine which quantity they 
would like to buy. This is illustrated in the model as Q1 and equals the quantity where the 
retailer’s marginal cost equals margin revenue. At this point the supplier will sell at price w1 
and the retailer will charge end-consumer prices equal to P1. Compared to the situation with 
no buyer power, the end-consumer price has increased (from P0) and the wholesale price from 
supplier to retailer has decreased (from w0). Consequently, both end-consumers and suppliers 
are worse off, whereas the retailer has a net gain equal to the sum of the yellow squares 
subtracted by the blue square. 
 
The bargaining model is a framework where one considers different opportunities firms have 
of directly bargaining the terms and conditions of a trading agreement. In this framework the 
retailer do not have monopsony power but possesses some extent of bargaining power 
depending on the profitability of its own and the upstream party’s outside alternatives and 
their relative bargaining skills. This means that the two contracting players agree on certain 
contractual terms, rather than the retailers solely dictating. In this paper the relative 
bargaining skills are considered constant. Gabrielsen et al. (2013) asserts that it is more likely 
that the party will use flexible contracts rather than linear contracts when holding power over 
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the other. Consequently, using this model, bargaining power increases the probability of using 
non-price restraints in trading agreements.  
 
 
Figure 2.6. The bargaining model (Gabrielsen et al., 2013). 
 
2.2.2 Retail Buyer Power Framework 
Clarke et al. (2002) have developed a framework for the analysis of buyer power, drawn upon 
Dobson et al. (1998). The framework considers five questions, assessing signs of market 
power at buyer level, supplier level and end-consumer level. This assessment is followed by a 
consideration of how the nature of trading relationships affects market behavior, for instance 
mergers or the introduction of buyer groups. Lastly, the underlying economic conditions with 
regard to production and distribution are considered, with emphasis on the costs in the buying 
process, i.e. vertical restraints. 
 
The questions making up the framework are as follows:  
 
(1) Is there significant buyer power?  
(2) Is buying power against relatively powerless suppliers?  
(3) Does the buyer itself have significant selling power?  
(4) Are there significant efficiency gains associated with buyer power?  
(5) Does the buyer attempt to constrain its suppliers’ other actions or deliberately create a 
dependency relationship? (Clarke et al., 2002, p.24). 
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Question 1 is the qualifying question. For there to be significant buyer power in a relation, the 
power must be exploited so that it has a material effect on negotiated prices, the quantities 
offered and the viability of the traders. Indicators include buying a large proportion of the 
product and the use of contractual agreements as slotting allowances, upfront fees and similar. 
Evidence supporting question 2 includes low upstream seller concentration and absence of 
evidence that suppliers dictate terms. Conclusions about question 3 require an assessment of 
the downstream seller power of the buyer, also relative to the other market participants. 
Question 4 about efficiency gains relate to pooling of resources so that the buyer is able to 
achieve efficiency gains, in this case most interestingly in regards to purchasing. Clarke et al. 
(2002) asserts that the effects of the efficiency gains should be seen in relation to the seller 
power analyzed under question 3. Lastly, the final question relates to agreements where the 
charges are not related to any specific cost structure or when there are any specification 
clauses in the contracts. 
 
The framework is developed for policy purposes looking at the welfare consequences of 
market power. However, the framework is useful in determining if buyer power actually 
exists and if so, helps determine the extent of seller power at both supplier level and end-
consumer level. The framework is thus considered useful in this case analysis as a mean to 
analyze the extent of buyer power in the market.  
2.2.3 Consequences of Buyer Power 
Supplier Innovation 
According to Gabrielsen (2010) the long-term impact of buyer power is related to the profit 
transfer from supplier to retailers and the effects this has on innovation. The short-term effects 
are seen in prices and product range among the retailers. 
 
Academics disagree about the outcome of increased buyer power with regards to innovation 
at supplier level. According to Besanko, Dranove, Shanley and Schaefer (2007) innovations 
may suffer from lack of financial resources or as a consequence of the hold-up problem. The 
first may arise when suppliers are so pushed on price that there are no financial resources 
available for innovation. The hold-up problem however occurs due to the risk that the 
counterpart will behave opportunistically in the future, after substantial non-reversible 
investments are made. 
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The introduction of private labels may however increase innovation among suppliers, due to 
the fear of strong competition from retailers themselves. Private labels are brands owned by 
the chains and exclusively sold in their stores. Their counterpart is national brands, which are 
owned by the upstream suppliers and distributed at a national scale. Private label products are 
either of lower quality and price than national brands, at the same quality but at a lower price, 
a horizontally differentiated alternative with a lower price, or a premium brand acting as a 
substitute to national brands both on quality and price (Berges-Sennou, Bontemps & 
Requillart, 2004). 
Private Label Products 
Private labels are considered to impact the bargaining position of retailers on two levels. First, 
private labels may directly increase the bargaining position through an increased number of 
alternative suppliers. These suppliers may either be vertically integrated in the chain’s supply 
chain or produce the products on a contractual basis. The bargaining power is evident in that 
the switching costs of private label products are considered low. This is mostly due to the fact 
that the private-label producers often use their excess capacity. In addition, the product is still 
considered the same; independent of which supplier that produces the product. Thus, the 
customer will only to a limited extent be able to notice a change of producer. Consequently, 
the retailer can also credibly threaten with shift of supplier (Gabrielsen, 2010). Private labels 
may also create scarcity of shelf space. However, this effect is reduced if certain suppliers 
have particularly strong brands, so-called “must-carry products”, which the buyer would not 
consider to exclude from its shelves as it is essential for customers visiting the store 
(Gabrielsen & Sørgard, 2009). 
 
Secondly, the chain initiates the production of private labels; hence it will be able to gain 
insight into production costs. The 2000 Private Label Manufacturers Industry Roundtable, 
quoted in Steinar (2004), asserted the latter, recognizing that the chains in this case interact 
with the suppliers horizontally as competitors, as also stated by Dobson (2005). 
 
Private label products may also increase retailers’ competitiveness in the end-consumer 
market when the brands are introduced as a reaction to other chains’ introduction of private 
labels. However, competition may also decrease if the introduction of private label makes the 
chains more differentiated (Steiner, 2004). According to a French survey by LSA/Fournier 
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(1996), quoted in Berges-Sennou et al. (2004), private labels were introduced to create 
customer loyalty and improve positioning in the market (improve margins and lower prices). 
 
Steiner (2004) points out that chains often look to narrowly on the gross margin of private 
labels. The profitability of private label products is often overstated due to underestimation of 
non-invoice costs. Steiner (2004) mentions the costs of interest expenses being negatively 
correlated to the turnover rate, of which private labels’ are lower than the national brands’. 
Additionally, the opportunity cost of scare shelf space and the costs of sourcing, designing 
and selling the private label have to be taken into consideration. 
The Waterbed Effect 
A negative impact of relative increases in buyer power among retailers is known as the 
waterbed effect. According to Inderst and Valletti (2011) the waterbed effect arises when a 
relatively larger buyer obtains additional discounts due to its size, i.e. a retailer is able to 
exercise asymmetric buyer power due to being larger than its competitors. The waterbed 
effect comes into play when smaller participants in the market must carry the supplier’s costs 
of offering the larger participant better terms and conditions. The larger participant will be 
able to reduce end-consumer prices due to its cost advantage and gain larger market shares, 
hence, will be able to buy larger quantities in the future. As a result, the smaller parties will 
lose some sales, which in turn worsen their bargaining position and terms and conditions. 
Consequently, the wholesale price faced by the large retailer has fallen whereas the wholesale 
prices paid by smaller participants have risen. Eventually, smaller retailers would like to 
increase their prices to pass on the increase in the wholesale prices; however, the increased 
competition from the large retailer counteracts this effect (Inderst & Valletti, 2011). 
 
The assumption behind Inderst and Valletti ‘s (2011) model is that the improved terms and 
conditions are also obtained at the margin, i.e. also through wholesale prices and not only 
through lump-sum payments.  The assumption allows for the larger retailer to a gain a more 
competitive position in the end-consumer market, as it is able to pass on the benefits to end-
consumer prices. 
 
2.3 Competitiveness 
In this paper the rather broad definition of the Selected Committee of the House of Lords on 
Oversea Trade (1985), quoted in Buckley, Pass and Prescott (1988) is used: “A firm is 
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competitive if it can produce products and services of superior quality and lower costs than its 
domestic and international competitors. Competitiveness is synonymous with a firm's long-
run profit performance and its ability to compensate its employees and provide superior 
returns to its owners.” Thus, one can say that competitiveness is related to market 
performance, being dependent upon high performance, however, not necessarily on an 
advantage over competitors. Nevertheless, competitiveness is a relative concept measured in 
relation to an existing comparator (Buckley et al., 1988).  
According to Buckley et al. (1988) there are typically three perspectives of competitiveness: 
performance, potential and management process. Performance is a measure of how well the 
firm is doing relative to its competitors, potential is the availability and quality of the inputs 
that produce superior performance, whereas the process is concerned with how competitive 
potential is transformed into competitive performance. All perspectives and their 
interrelationship must be taken into account when analyzing changes in competitiveness. The 
interrelationship is shown in figure 2.7. 
 
Figure 2.7. The interrelationship between measures of competitiveness (Buckley et al., 1988). 
 
Potential is measured by considering the cost competitiveness and price competitiveness, 
respectively how cost efficient the firm is and which relative retail wholesale prices it 
operates with. Additionally, productivity and technological development are common 
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measures; in this paper the latter translates to innovation among the umbrella chains in terms 
of private label introductions. 
The management processes are qualitative measures of ownership advantage, management 
relations internally and externally, closeness to customer, economies of scale and scope and 
marketing aptitude. By marketing aptitude is meant the non-price competition means, i.e. 
determining the target customers’ demand and deliver the right mix of quality, service, 
marketing and similar to satisfy their needs. 
Lastly, the performance is considered as the financial results that the firm delivers. This can 
be determined by financial ratios, indicating the firm ability to turn sales into profit and 
deliver satisfactory returns to its owners. Additionally, market share and growth are important 
indicators of the firms’ competitiveness. In this paper the performance variable is in focus but 
due to the variables’ interrelationship it is of concern how the others affect the performance. 
 
2.4 Market Structure 
The market structure of a firm is the sum of four basic characteristics of its market 
environment. These characteristics are the number and size of buyers, sellers and potential 
entrants; the degree of product differentiation; the amount and costs of information about 
product price and quality; the entry/expansion and exit barriers (Brickley, Smith & 
Zimmerman, 2009). 
 
The two extremes of market structures are perfectively competitive markets and monopolies. 
Perfectly competitive markets have a large number of potential buyers and seller, product 
homogeneity, rapid dissemination of information at low costs and no costs of entry or exit in 
the market (Brickley et al., 2009). A monopoly has only one seller but many buyers, thus 
allowing the one buyer to choose at which price and to which accompanied quantity it will 
sell to maximize its profits (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2009). An oligopolistic market is an 
intermediate between perfectly competitive markets and monopoly, consisting of only a few 
competing firms.  
 
According to Pindyck & Rubinfeld (2009), in an oligopoly profitability and the extent of 
monopoly power are dependent upon how closely the firms interact. Oligopolistic markets are 
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highly sensitive to strategic decisions as the participants will both be affected by and react to 
changes of other firms. Consequently, it is expected that the relative level of terms and 
conditions between the market participants will influence the relative competitiveness of the 
firms. The participants in the market compete on either price or quantity, respectively known 
as Bertrand or Cournot competition.  
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3 The Norwegian Grocery Retail Market 
In section 3.1 the four market participants are presented. Section 3.2 presents the market 
development from 1990 to 2013, including market shares, number of stores and total industry 
turnover. Lastly, section 3.3 considers the market situation for Norwegian consumers and 
section 3.4 presents the supplier market. 
3.1 Market Participants 
Four large umbrella chains control the Norwegian grocery retail market with a combined 
market share of about 96%. The chains are Ica Norge, Coop Norge, Reitangruppen and 
NorgesGruppen (Nielsen, 2014). In addition to all being large in terms of market shares, the 
chains have also integrated vertically into wholesale operations (Pettersen, 2013). Bunnpris is 
the fifth market participant, however it constitutes an insignificant proportion of the market 
with a market share of 3.6% and will therefore not be analyzed.  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Market shares 2013 (Nielsen, 2014). 
 
The market participants operate in four different segments: discount, local, supermarket and 
hypermarket. Discount stores typically have a low-price (and low-cost focus), thus carry a 
more limited product range of about 2,000-3,000 products to keep costs down. Local stores 
carry a wider range of products, which is often locally adapted, however, their sales area is 
often limited. Supermarkets have a wide product range, from 5,000-20,000 in the largest 
stores. Hypermarkets carry about 10,000-25,000 products and sell other products than solely 
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grocery products, e.g. clothing, building materials, toys etc., known as one-stop shopping 
(Pradhan, 2009). An overview of the different chains within each segment can be found in 
table 3.1. 
3.1.1 ICA Norge AS 
ICA Norge AS was a wholly owned subsidiary of the Swedish-based ICA Gruppen (before 
May 2013: Hakon Invest). On October 6, 2014 it was announced that Coop Norge has 
acquired the Group’s Norwegian business (Ica Gruppen, 2014a). ICA Gruppen has retail 
activities in Sweden, Norway and the Baltics, as well as operations in real estate. The Group 
is one of the leading retail firms in the Nordics. In Sweden Ica has a market share of more 
than 50% (Delfi, DLF & Fri Köpenskap, 2014). The Group’s chains are either wholly owned 
or operated through franchising agreements (Ica Gruppen, 2014b). 
 
ICA Gruppen was formed in 1917 as a buyer group and has had a long history of mergers and 
acquisitions. The entry in the Norwegian market was realized through a partial ownership 
with Hakon Gruppen (formerly known as Hagen Gruppen), which owned Rimi. In 1998, the 
two companies created ICA AB, which in year 2000 was acquired by Dutch Royal Ahold BV, 
creating ICA Ahold. By 2003 ICA Ahold and Hakon Gruppen changed names to ICA and 
ICA Norge respectively, and in 2004 the Norwegian stake in the company was sold, leaving 
60% to Ahold and 40% to Hakon Invest. In 2013 Ahold divested its stake and the now all-
Swedish parent company changed its name to ICA Gruppen. 
 
In 2013 ICA Norge contributed to about 17% of Ica Gruppen’s sales, or 16,463mSEK (Ica 
Gruppen, 2014c). In the Norwegian market, the company is represented with three brands: 
ICA, Rimi and Matkroken constituting a combined amount of 571 stores. The first brand 
consists of supermarket stores focusing on quality fresh food. Rimi is the chain’s discount 
stores whereas Matkroken consists of small and locally adapted convenience stores. About 
60% of ICA Norge’s stores are wholly owned, while the remaining is operated as franchises. 
Rimi is by far the most important concept, contributing to more than 60% of ICA Norge’s 
sales in 2013 (Ica Gruppen, 2014c).  
Involvement in the Vertical Supply Chain 
Ica uses its wholesale firm ICA Logistikk for the distribution of its products (Pettersen, 2013). 
The chain has no extensive vertical integration or partnerships with suppliers. 
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Private labeled products account for 9.7% of Ica Norge’s sales. The private labels include 
“Selection” with focus on quality, “Smart365” which is low-cost products and “I love eco” 
consisting of ecological products. 
 
3.1.2 Coop Norge  
Coop Norge (Coop) is the Norwegian consumer cooperative, consisting of over 100 
cooperatives gathered under the parent company Coop Norge SA. The consumer cooperation 
runs 1,100 stores all over Norway and has about 1.4 million members. Any consumer is 
allowed membership through a small one-time fee. All stores operating under the Coop brand 
are owned by the local cooperatives (Coop, 2014). 
 
Coop Norge SA has several subsidiaries, with wholly owned Coop Norge Handel AS and 
Coop Norge Eiendom AS as the largest firms. Coop Norge Handel AS (hereafter referred to 
as Coop) is responsible for procurement, logistics, and administration and marketing of 
grocery and specialist products. 
 
Coop operates among others the chains Coop Extra, Coop Obs! and Coop Marked, which are 
their focus concepts in the discount, hypermarket and local segment respectively. Coop Extra 
is currently the fastest growing grocery chain in Norway (Coop, 2014). With the acquisition 
of Ica in October 2014 Coop will much likely gain a stronger foothold in the Norwegian 
market. 
Involvement in the Vertical Supply Chain 
As the other participants in the market, Coop distributes a large part of its products through its 
own distribution system. According to Ukeavisen Ledelse, Coop’s Director of 
Communication has stated that the goal is to handle all distribution internally (Libell, 2013). 
In the end of 2013, the group opened a new storage facility with a high degree of automation, 
allowing them to close in on this goal. The firm has expressed their need for restructuring to 
keep up with their competitors and the new facility is a mean to do so (Coop, 2014).  
 
Coop has also integrated vertically into production. Coop Norge Industri AS is a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Coop. This subsidiary owns the suppliers Coop Kaffe (coffee), Røra 
(lemonade, juice and jam) and Gomanbakeren (baked goods).  
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Private labels account for about 16% of sales in Coop. Coop’s private labels are divided along 
four segments. “X-tra” is intended at the price-conscious customer and “Coop” is an 
alternative to national brands, with the same quality but at a lower price. “Coop Smak 
forskjellen”, which targets the quality-conscious customer, has a focus on taste and was in 
2013 the fastest growing of the four. Lastly, the brand “Änglamark” consists of ecological and 
allergy friendly products (Coop, 2014). 
 
3.1.3 Reitangruppen 
Reitangruppen AS is Norway’s sixth largest firm and wholly owned by the Reitan family. Its 
history dates back to 1948. The group consists of four business areas located in Norway, 
Denmark, Sweden, Finland and the Baltics, see figure 3.3 (Reitangruppen, 2014a). 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Reitangruppen AS, business areas (Reitangruppen, 2014a). 
 
REMA 1000 represents the only brand under grocery retailing activities of the group. Reitan 
Convenience is the convenience operations, mainly run through Narvesen and 7-Eleven. Uno-
X Gruppen operates within fuel and energy. Additionally, the group has financial investments 
in Axfood (15.6%) (Swedish grocery retailer and wholesaler) and Spaceworld (97%) (private 
electronic goods). After Lidl’s (the German hard-discount chain’s) failure in the Norwegian 
market, Reitangruppen was also able to acquire Lidl’s stores, employees, warehouses and 
main office facilities allowing Reitangruppen to expand its business further (Reitangruppen, 
2014a). 
 
REMA 1000 operates within the discount segment and is the leading concept chain in Norway 
with a market share of 23.1% (Nielsen, 2014). The first REMA 1000 store opened in 1979 
inspired by the German discount-giant Aldi. From 1979 REMA 1000 has gradually expanded 
to all parts of Norway and by the end of 2013, 528 stores were connected to the REMA 1000 
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brand. In 1994, the first REMA 1000 store was opened in Denmark. All of REMA 1000’s 
stores are operated as franchises, emphasizing ownership and closeness to the local market. 
The franchising concept implies that franchisees own the stores and run the daily operations 
governed by Reitangruppen’s principles, but Reitangruppen as the franchisor is responsible 
for the distribution of goods and services  (Reitangruppen, 2014b). 
Involvement in the Vertical Supply Chain 
REMA 1000 gained control over its wholesale operations in 1998 through the merger with 
REMAGross-selskapene. Today, Rema Distribusjon distributes the chain’s products 
(Pettersen, 2013). Reitangruppen has a partial ownership together with NorgesGruppen in 
BAMA, which delivers fruit and vegetables to the two firms. The groups own respectively 
45.54% and 19.8% of the wholesaler. BAMA has a market share of about 70% within its 
segment (Ministry of Agriculture and Food, 2011). 
 
Throughout the years, Reitangruppen has fully or partly acquired several suppliers, some of 
which today produce the firm’s private label products (Reitangruppen, 2014a). Consequently, 
Reitangruppen has integrated heavily into its upstream value chain. The ownership stakes are 
organized under REMA Industrier. The uniqueness of the group’s integration strategy is its 
focus on particular suppliers and industries and exclusivity agreements with some of these, 
e.g. Nordfjord Kjøtt and Grans Bryggeri (Pettersen, 2013).  
 
REMA 1000 carries several different private label brands, accounting for about 18% of its 
sales, the largest share among the market participants. “Nordfjord” is affordable meat 
products, “Stange” is high-quality chicken products, “Solvinge” is eggs and “Godehav” 
consists of fish products. Additionally, the brand “Soft Style” consists of non-food products 
such as candles, napkins and disposable cutlery, carried at lower prices than those of their 
respective national competitors (Rema, 2014). 
 
3.1.4 NorgesGruppen  
NorgesGruppen ASA (NorgesGruppen) is the largest trading enterprise in Norway and is 
controlled by the family-owned firm Joh. Johannson AS. NorgesGruppen has roots back to 
1866, when Joh. Johannson established a wholesale company. NorgesGruppen was 
established in 2000 through a merger between this wholesale operator, retail chains and 
concept chains (NorgesGruppen, 2014a). NorgesGruppen operates within real estate and other 
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activities but its core operations are retail and wholesale trade (Norgesgruppen, 2014b), see 
figure 3.3 for the business areas of the group.  
 
 
Figure 3.3. NorgesGruppen ASA, business areas (NorgesGruppen, 2014a). 
 
The retailing operations of NorgesGruppen include both grocery and convenience trade.  
 
NorgesGruppen as it is known today was established in 1993 when most of the independent 
retailers that where not already a part of Reitangruppen, Hakon Gruppen (Ica) or 
Forbrukersamvirket (Coop) gathered under Norgesdetalj (NorgesGruppen, 2014b). Today, 
NorgesGruppen is represented in about 85% of Norway’s municipalities and counts about 
1,700 stores under its brand (NorgesGruppen 2014a). NorgesGruppen obtains its revenues 
from the sale of products in self-owned stores and through membership charges from its 
afflicted concept chains. The Group’s concepts chains are organized under the branches Kiwi, 
Meny/Ultra and lastly Kjøpsmannshuset, being represented in the discount, 
supermarket/hypermarket and supermarket/local stores respectively. Kiwi is the group’s 
number one concept chain, being Norway’s largest chain in number of stores and the second 
largest in terms of turnover.  
Involvement in the Vertical Supply Chain 
NorgesGruppen runs its distribution through its wholly owned wholesaler ASKO. ASKO 
delivers about 80% of the umbrella chain’s products (Norgesgruppen, 2014a). The long-term 
goal of the group is to distribute its entire product range (Gabrielsen, 2010). As mentioned, 
NorgesGruppen also has ownership stakes in BAMA. 
 
NorgesGruppen has not pursued an active acquisition strategy in the upstream supply chain, 
but the development, procurement, sale and marketing of its private label products is 
conducted by the subsidiary Unil AS (Pettersen, 2013; NorgesGruppen, 2014a). Private 
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labels’ share of sales is about 10%. NorgesGruppen reports that private labels are developed 
to provide consumers with a broader choice of products, as well as provide affordable 
alternatives to national brands. The range of private labels include “First Price” and 
“Eldorado”, which are low-price products, and “Jacobs Utvalgte” which represents 
NorgesGruppen’s premium products (Norgesgruppen, 2014a). 
 
 
 Ica  Coop  Reitangruppen NorgesGruppen 
Discount chains 
• Rimi 
• Coop Prix 
• Coop Extra 
• REMA 1000 • KIWI 
Local chains • Matkroken 
• (ICA Nær) 
• Coop 
Marked 
N/A 
• Nærbutikken 
• Joker 
Supermarket chains 
• ICA 
Supermarked 
• Coop Mega N/A 
• Spar/Eurospar 
• Meny 
• CC Mart’n 
Hypermarket chains 
N/A 
• Coop Obs! 
• (Coop Smart 
Club) 
N/A 
• Ultra/Centra 
 
Table 3.1. The different discount, local, hypermarket and supermarket chains under each umbrella chain 
per 2013 (based on Nielsen, 2014). 
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 Ica Coop Reitangruppen NorgesGruppen 
Number of 
stores 
571 1,100 528 1,700 
Market share 11.1% 22.7% 23.1% 39.3% 
Revenue (NOK) 15,688 31,468 58,957 67,396 
EBIT (NOK) -851 56 3,041 2,274 
Private label 
share 
9.7% 16% 18% 10% 
Ownership in 
suppliers 
Totenpoteter 
AS 
• Coop Norge 
Industri AS 
• Coop Norge 
Kaffe AS 
• AS Margarin-
fabrikken 
Norge 
• Goman-
bakeren 
Holding AS 
• AS Røra 
Fabrikker 
• Smart Club 
Gourmet AS 
• Hvebergs-
moen 
Potetbakeri 
AS 
• Rema Industrier 
AS (private 
labels) 
• Kjeldsberg 
Kaffebrenneri 
AS 
• Bama Gruppen 
AS 
• MaxMat AS 
• Spekeloftet AS 
• Norsk Kylling 
AS 
• Grans Bryggeri 
AS 
• Staur Foods AS 
• Norsk Kjøtt AS 
• Hugaas 
Industrier AS 
• Other smaller 
food industry 
firms 
• Unil AS 
(private 
labels) 
• Bama 
Gruppen AS 
• Joh. 
Johannson 
Kaffe AS 
• Bakers AS 
• Lille Asia 
Catering AS 
Table 3.2. Summary of the market per 2013, based on the umbrella chains’ financial statements, Nielsen, 
2014 and Pettersen, 2013. 
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3.2 Market Development 
The trend of chain collaborations started in the mid-eighties, and by 1993 the structure in the 
Norwegian market was definitively changed. Figure 3.4 below shows the distribution of the 
market shares from 1990 to 2013. As exhibited by the orange bars in the figure, “other” (or 
independently organized) actors in the market were heavily reduced by 1993 and over the 
next 20 years they have been nearly non-existing. Other actors clearly have had the largest 
change in market shares, followed by a positive change for NorgesGruppen and a negative 
change for Ica, see table 3.3. Please note that Bunnpris was considered a part of 
NorgesGruppen before 2010. 
3.2.1 Market Shares 
 
Figure 3.4. Market shares 1990 – 2013. (Nielsen, 2014; Nielsen, 2013; Nielsen 2008; ACNielsen, 2004; 
Haga, Berge, Haglerød & Hegrenes, 1997). 
 
 
 
Norges-
Gruppen 
REMA 
1000 
Coop 
ICA 
Norge 
Bunn-
pris 
Others 
Number of observations 24 24 24 24 4 24 
Mean 32.9% 15.9% 24.1% 20.9% 3.7% 5.4% 
Minimum 8.6% 9.0% 22.6% 11.1% 3.6% 0% 
Maximum 40.0% 23.1% 25.2% 28.6% 3.8% 48.6% 
Standard deviation .08 .04 .01 .06 .00 .13 
Table 3.3. Distribution of market shares 1990-2013.  
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3.2.2 Number of Stores 
The number of grocery stores in Norway has decreased over the time period of 1990 to 2013, 
especially until year 2000, see figure 3.5. Compared to 1990, today there are about 37% fewer 
stores. With an increasing Norwegian population, this implies a considerably lower fraction of 
stores per inhabitant. Still, Norway is the country in Western Europe with the highest number 
of stores per capita (Linthicum & Pinhammer, 2013). The high number of stores can partly be 
explained by Merkur, a government-run program aiming at developing and strengthen grocery 
stores in rural and sparsely populated areas. It is seen as an important tool in the regional 
policies to maintain the population pattern (Merkur-programmet, 2014). Another contribution 
factor to the high fraction of stores per capita is that all four of the participants are willing to 
operate stores in all parts of the country, as evidenced by the participants’ location patterns. 
 
A particular challenge stemming from the number of stores and their location are the logistics 
and transportation flows. The elongated and sparsely populated country requires a large 
distribution network with regards to the transportation of the products but also heavy 
investments in suitable properties. The distribution costs are further analyzed in section 6.3.1. 
 
The emergence of discount chains has increased significantly, making up about 60% of the 
market by 2013. Combined with the general reduction of stores, the growth of discount chains 
implies a reduction in the number of other stores within other segments. According to Coop 
the reduction is foremost in small and mid-sized supermarkets (Coop, 2014). 
 
Figure 3.5. The number of grocery retail stores from 1990-2013 and the market share of discount stores 
over the same period. (Nielsen, 2013; Lavik & Schøll, 2012). 
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3.2.3 Turnover 
The total turnover in grocery retail has steadily increased over the period, with a yearly 
average of 4.7% (4.6% through 1990-2000 and 5.0% through 2001-2013). 
 
Figure 3.6. Turnover and percentage change from previous year in the Norwegian grocery market 
between 1990 and 2013 (Nielsen, 2013; Lavik & Schøll, 2012). 
 
 
3.3 Customer Demand 
3.3.1 Price Level  
The price level on food and non-alcoholic beverages in Norway is the highest in Europe, as 
exhibited in figure 3.7. In comparison to the average of all EU-countries, Norwegian food 
prices are 76.6% higher. This is well ahead of the second most expensive country with prices 
50% above the EU average. However, 13% of total consumption spent on food and non-
alcoholic beverages is close to the EU average, see figure 3.8.  
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Figure 3.7. Price level indices of food and non-alcoholic beverages (Eurostat, 2014a). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8. Percentage of consumption spent on food and non-alcoholic beverages in 2012 (Eurostat, 
2014b). 
 
In Dagligvarehandelen og mat 2011 Pettersen and Kjuus (2011) assess the additional costs 
Norwegians pay for food and non-alcoholic beverages. They point to three identifiable 
aspects of the market: a generally higher cost level, import restrictions and additional fees and 
taxes paid on different products. The high cost level is partly explained by high wage levels 
and partly by high transportation and establishment costs. These relatively high costs are 
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found mainly to be caused by Norway’s widespread geographical distances, sparsely located 
population, large number of stores per capita and limited access to suitable locations. As a 
consequence of these factors, economies of scale are also less obtainable to smaller market 
participants (Pettersen & Kjuus, 2011). Lipsey and Swedborg (1996) and the Nordic 
Competition Authorities (2005), quoted in Pettersen and Kjuus (2011) also show that the price 
levels in countries tend to correlate positively with income. Import restrictions on agricultural 
products are assumed to extensively protect Norwegian suppliers and consequently 
Norwegian grocers from foreign competition and the market in general from intensified 
competition. Lastly, additional fees and taxes include instruments like taxes on products 
containing sugar and fees on alcohol and tobacco. Though the above mentioned factors 
explain a great amount of the price differences relative to other countries, there is still an 
unexplained rest due to other unexplored factors (Pettersen & Kjuus, 2011).  
Availability of price information 
Pricing decisions in the grocery market are based on maximum prices set centrally (at concept 
chain level in NorgesGruppen) and end-consumer prices are determined on the basis of the 
individual chains’ pricing strategies (the Norwegian Competition Authority, 2005). According 
to the Food Chain Committee’s report (2011) the four umbrella chains aim at having uniform 
prices across its stores, independent on where in Norway the stores are located. This decision 
increases the availability of pricing information, as each store on a local level will not 
compete individually on price with adjacent stores, but the price competition unfolds on the 
national level. Therefore there are fewer points of interest to investigate and collection of 
prices is more easily obtainable. 
 
Several price comparisons are conducted and published yearly, e.g. VGs Matbørs (see section 
5), and in 2013 “Enhver.no” started conducting weekly price comparison. Such comparisons 
are typically conducted by using average market baskets. Though price comparisons are 
intended at customers, a certain amount of the products appear from test to test. 
Consequently, the chains can monitor their competitors on particular products gathered in the 
basket. In addition to these price comparisons, the umbrella chains employ for positions were 
the task is to investigate the prices of competitors (Moflag, 2013; finn.no; karrierestart.no). 
Not only does this practice increase availability of information but it also supports the 
importance of low prices. The benefits from employing these price checkers can be assumed 
to outweigh the chains’ costs of access to competitors’ prices.  
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3.3.2 Product Range 
A wide product range is considered a to be a good thing as it gives customers a larger freedom 
of choice (Ministry of Agriculture and Food, 2011). According to the Norwegian Competition 
Authority (2009a), a relatively smaller product range in a country may indicate problems with 
the competition. It has not been found any updated investigations comparing the product 
range in Norway to that of other European countries and to initiate such a collection is outside 
the scope of this paper. However, building on older reports, the Norwegian grocery market is 
shown to have a much smaller range of products than similar countries (Nordic Competition 
Authorities, 2005; Ministry of Agriculture and Food, 2011). By comparison, Swedish grocery 
stores typically have twice as many products as their Norwegian counterparts (Dulsrud & 
Johannesen, 2011). This paper assumes that it is not likely that this deviation has grown 
considerably smaller over the last three years. Dulsrud and Johannessen (2011) found the 
percentage growth rate of new products in the Norwegian market to be slightly higher than 
that of Sweden, however, the share of discount stores is larger in Norway, indicating that this 
growth will subside.  
 
The large share of discount stores suggests that Norwegian customers are more price sensitive 
than they are concerned with a wide selection of products as indicated in the customers 
surveys. Therefore, there are some indications that there are a deviation between what 
customers say and how they act (the Norwegian Competition Authority, 2011). Discount 
stores typically carry fewer products due to their low-cost strategy. An increased number of 
products will lower turnover, increase waste and obsolescence and increase the amount of 
capital employed. Thus, costs would be driven upward (Ministry of Agriculture and Food, 
2011).  
Private Label Products 
Compared to other countries, the private label share in Norway is considered low (European 
Commission, 2012); however, the share has increased steadily from 8% around year 2000. 
For the incumbents to be able to compete more fiercely on price, the use of private labels 
increased at the time of the hard discounter Lidl’s entry in the Norwegian market in 2004 
(Utgård, 2010) but it still do not account for more than 13.4% of sales in 2013 
(Daglivarehandelen, 2013). 
 
The development of private labels in Norway was initiated by Coop in the 1980s, followed by 
the other chains in the 1990s. In the beginning, private labeled products were cheap 
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substitutes to the national brands, but over the years products of higher quality have also been 
sold under the chains’ private labels at relatively higher prices (Utgård, 2010).  
 
 
Figure 3.9. Private label products’ share of sales from 2003-2013 (Nielsen, 2014; Nielsen, 2013, Nielsen, 
2008, ACNielsen, 2004). 
 
Degree of Product Differentiation 
The grocery retailers are differentiated on a geographical level due to differences in their total 
retail offer, i.e. differences in location of the stores, the service level offered, opening hours, 
product range and general availability (the Norwegian Competition Authority, 2008). Table 
3.1 showed that the four umbrella chains (with the exception of Reitangruppen) operate in 
different segments, i.e. discount, supermarket, hypermarket and local stores. This 
diversification can be seen as a mean to fulfill different demands and may help the chains 
increase sales through a larger differentiated customer base. 
 
In such a horizontal product differentiation, customers subjectively prefer different products. 
Due to the different preferences, the firm selling one of the products can increase the 
product’s price without loosing all sales. A small price increase that positively increases sales 
value is expected to outweigh the negative effect due to loss of customers to competitors 
(Sørgard, 2011).  
 
In sum, grocery chains offer rather homogenous products but differ on a horizontal level due 
to variables such as location and service level, much of which are exhibited by different 
concept chains under each umbrella chain.  
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3.4 Suppliers 
The Norwegian Competition Authority (2005) divides the suppliers of grocery products into 
six categories: international groups (Nestlé, Procter & Gamble), national groups (Orkla, Oluf 
Lorentzen), international brand suppliers (Coca-Cola, Kelloggs), national brand suppliers 
(Tine, Gilde), regional suppliers and local suppliers. In 2013, the organization Grocery 
Manufacturers of Norway (DLF) counted 105 suppliers constituting about 95% of the sales of 
branded products in Norway (DLF, 2014). As such, DLF is an important counterpart to the 
umbrella chains and an important voice towards government, interest groups and media.  
 
Norwegian suppliers of agricultural products are in large protected by import restrictions, 
allowing them a less competitive environment by restricting foreign producers to sell their 
products in the market under the same conditions. As such, Norwegian suppliers are 
considered to have a competitive advantage over foreign suppliers and the restrictions also 
reduce retailers sourcing alternatives. These factors may increase the selling power of the 
suppliers. According to the Competition Authority (2011) Norwegian suppliers do however 
deliver to a particularly restricted market, making it difficult to extract economies of scale in 
production and be able to obtain a more differentiated product range. Supported by the 
discussion of the product range in section 3.3.2 this is a possible explanation of the limited 
selection of products in Norwegian grocery stores. The development of private labels will 
however increase customers’ alternatives. Moreover, private labels contribute to further 
differentiation among the chains since the private labels are exclusively sold in the respective 
umbrella chains.  
 
The different upstream food supply categories are also highly concentrated with few and large 
participants. Figure 3.10 is adopted from report of the Food Chain Committee (2011) and 
shows the market share of the three largest suppliers within certain product categories. The 
exhibited categories cover about 50% of the food sales in Norway and were chosen by the 
Committee because they were representative for an average grocery basket (Ministry of 
Agriculture and Food, 2011; Dulsrud & Johannesen, 2011). As exhibited by the figure, the 
concentration in the downstream market seems to be balanced within several categories by a 
concentrated upstream market. It is also important to remember that the market shares of the 
umbrella chains in the end-consumer market may not reflect a chain’s positions towards 
suppliers, but generally they are a good indication (the Norwegian Competition Authority, 
2005). 
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Figure 3.10. Market shares of the three largest suppliers within certain categories (Ministry of Agriculture 
and Food, 2011). From the left: goat cheese, milk, poultry, hard yellow cheese, eggs, coffee, beer, sausages, 
minced meat, chocolate, carbonated beverages, frozen fish, rice, pasta, snacks, pure meat and fresh bread. 
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4 Methodology 
The following section describes and assesses the research methodology applied in this paper. 
The paper is conducted as a case study. Section 4.1 describes the case study approach. 
Thereafter, section 4.2 describes the data collection in case studies. Lastly, section 4.3 
assesses the research quality by considering the construct validity, external validity and 
reliability of the paper. 
4.1 Research Design – the Case Study Approach 
Research is the process of finding out things in a systematic way, meaning that the findings 
are based on logical relationships rather than beliefs (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2012). 
The research design is the logical sequence that connects empirical data, the research question 
and conclusions (Yin, 2014). This paper employs a case study approach to assess how terms 
and conditions of trade influence competitiveness at retail level in the Norwegian grocery 
market. Case study research is according to Yin (2014) appropriate for “how” and “why” 
questions, situations of which no behavioral control is required and when the focus is on a 
contemporary event, as are applicable in this paper.  
 
The scope of a case study is to empirically investigate “a contemporary phenomenon in depth 
and within its real world context” (Yin, 2014, p. 16). Yin (2014, p. 16) further points out that 
a case study is especially applicable “when the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
may not be clearly evident”. However, the latter is not understood as a definite feature of a 
case study. Contextual conditions are conditions from outside of the case, as for example the 
market structure in which a firm operates, even though this surely could be overlapping with 
the actual case. This is also the case in this paper. It is also noted that the recognition of any 
blurring between the contextual condition and the case is a strength of the case study and that 
it could give additional insight to the case.  
 
A case study can be exploratory, descriptive or explanatory (Yin, 2014). Exploratory studies 
aim at further developing and investigating research questions. These studies are often 
conducted when the phenomenon in question is new and complex. Through exploratory 
studies the aim is to gain a greater understanding of a topic by discovering what is happening. 
Descriptive studies describe a phenomenon in its real-life context, to some degree building on 
existing knowledge about it. The objective is to describe the characteristics and correlations of 
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the phenomenon in a limited space of time to get an accurate description of events, persons or 
situations. In explanatory studies the researcher develops propositions and aims at explaining 
causal relationships regarding the research question (Saunders et al., 2012). The research 
design in this paper is descriptive as the paper’s aim is to contribute to the understanding of 
how terms and conditions of trade, hereunder the use of different vertical restraints, in grocery 
markets affect the competition among market participants at retail level. 
 
The time horizon of a research can be either cross-sectional or longitudinal. The former 
implies the study of a particular phenomenon at a particular point in time. On the other hand, 
longitudinal research studies change and develop and can be said to cover more cross-
sectional periods (Saunders et al., 2012). This paper assesses the situation in the grocery 
based on the claims that the terms and conditions of trade in the grocery market differ 
substantially between the market participants at the retail level. To be able to assess this effect 
over time and consider implications of this statement, the research is conducted at a 
longitudinal level. 
 
In case studies, five important components of the research design must be addressed: the 
research question(s), potential propositions (form the basis of what should be investigated 
further), unit(s) of analysis, the logical linking of data to the propositions and criteria for 
interpreting the findings (Yin, 2014).  
 
The research question is how do terms and conditions of trade influence competitiveness at 
retail level in the Norwegian grocery industry. Connected to this question, the propositions 
are as follows: 
 
(1) The competition in the Norwegian grocery market is oligopolistic, i.e. each market 
participant’s decisions affect the other participants. 
(2) The vertical integration of the umbrella chains into wholesale operations has increased 
retailers bargaining power towards suppliers, i.e. allows retailers to obtain improved 
terms and conditions of trade through the use of different vertical restraints. 
(3) Differences in size among the market participants imply differences in their terms and 
conditions of trade. 
(4) Differences in terms and conditions of trade imply differences in profitability. 
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The unit of analysis is the Norwegian grocery market, restricted to the horizontal competition 
at retail level. Linked to this main unit of analysis are the four major market participants as 
four independent subordinated units.  
 
Yin (2014) suggests five analytic ways to link the data and propositions: pattern matching, 
explanation building, time-series analysis, logic models and cross-case synthesis. In this paper 
the first two will be applied. Pattern matching implies a comparison of the findings of the 
study with the predicted findings to create inference. Explanation building is a part of pattern 
matching where the researcher focuses on using the data to develop an explanation about the 
occurrences in the case. Thus, the researcher must answer how and why the phenomenon 
occurred. The criteria for interpreting can be obtained through statistical inference when 
applicable or alternatively by considering rival explanations to the findings throughout the 
research phase. 
 
A case study can take the form of a single-case holistic design, single-case embedded design, 
multiple-case holistic design or multiple-case embedded design. Single-case studies should be 
applied when the case is a critical test of existing theory, an unusual situation, a common 
case, or the case has a revelatory or longitudinal purpose. On the other hand, multiple-case 
studies are studies containing more than one single case and are often perceived as 
comparative. Multiple-case studies are often considered more robust; however they are 
extremely resource intensive. A case study is holistic when there is only one unit of analysis, 
whereas the study is embedded when there are multiple units being analyzed. 
 
In this paper a single-case embedded design is chosen. The rational for this design lays in the 
focus at the Norwegian grocery market as the main unit but assessing the four market 
participants individually to conclude about the impact of vertical restraints on 
competitiveness. The case study is conducted using theory about vertical restraints and 
applying to the market the theoretical propositions from this literature, combined with 
indicators of profitability. 
 
4.2 Data Collection 
Distinctive case study research methods as studying conditions over time and covering 
contextual conditions all result in a large number of variables. As the case itself is the only 
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data point, a feature of case studies is that it has more variables of interest than data points. 
Consequently, case study results will often rely on multiple sources of evidence. Due to the 
extensive amount of data, the collection and analysis for a case study benefits from prior 
development of theoretical propositions (Yin, 2014).  
 
The Norwegian grocery market has been under investigation over a longer period and in 2011 
this research was compiled in the report “the Powerful and Powerless of the Food Supply 
Chain” (Ministry of Agriculture and Food, 2011). However, the report mainly assessed 
qualitative aspects without supporting the findings with any numerical evidence. As such, this 
paper aims at building on the propositions in the 2011 report regarding the use of different 
vertical restraints, supported by theory about the subject, to consider how competitiveness 
differ due to changes in terms and conditions of trade. 
 
According to Yin (2014) case study evidence comes from six major sources: documents, 
archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant-observation and physical artifacts. 
Additionally there are four supporting principles important to the collection of data, aimed at 
supporting construct validity and reliability. The first, using multiple sources of evidence, will 
make conclusions more cogent when different sources support each other. The second, 
creating a case study database, is important for the organization and documentation of the 
collected data. The database should consist of both a collection of all data gather during the 
research as well as the case study report itself. The third principle is maintaining a chain of 
evidence. By this is meant that the reader should be able to follow the development of the 
evidence, from the initial research question to the conclusion, in both directions. 
Consequently, the researcher must be aware of reasonable citing of sources. In addition, the 
methodical procedures should be documented. The fourth principle, exercise care when using 
data from electronic sources, is specifically related to crosschecking of online material (Yin, 
2014). 
 
Qualitative research aims at understanding the situation according to theory by using non-
numeric data as words, images, videos and similar. The data collected are subjective 
meanings expressed by the study’s participants about the phenomenon under study. 
Quantitative data are selectively chosen and represent a specific part of the truth. The data is 
numeric and aim at examining the relationship between variables (Saunders et al., 2012). The 
two designs are often seen as “two ends of a continuum, which in practice are often mixed” 
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(Saunders et al., 2012, p. 161). Using both qualitative and quantitative data in research is 
known as mixed methods research. In this paper a mixed methods research is chosen to be 
able to triangulate, i.e. combine data to support findings from the different methods, and to 
obtain diversity in the information and reflections. Additionally, a mixed method allows for 
the data to complement each other and thus confirm, link and elaborate on findings. Saunders 
et al. (2012) differentiate between a deductive and an inductive approach. The former implies 
designing the project to test existing theoretical propositions, whereas the latter implies 
developing theories based on collected data. This paper follows a deductive approach.  
 
Among researchers the case study approach has been criticized for not being rigorous enough. 
In addition the method has been questioned for its generalizing abilities. However, as with 
experiments, case studies can be generalized to theoretical propositions, even though they are 
not applicable for entire populations. Additionally, case study research has been criticized for 
its often-extensive amount of collected data, which can easily make the researcher lost and the 
report incomprehensive (Yin, 2014).  Thus, it is important for me during the research phase to 
be especially aware of these aspects. 
 
4.3 Research Quality 
There are three concepts used to judge the research quality of descriptive case studies: 
construct validity, external validity and reliability.  
4.3.1 Construct Validity 
Construct validity is the credibility of the study’s results and whether others will agree on the 
conclusions based on the unit of analysis (Yin, 2014).  
 
The paper is conducted using multiple sources of evidence. The main basis of the paper is the 
2011 report “The Powerful and the Powerless of the Food Supply Chain” by the Norwegian 
Inquiry Commissions for the Power Relations in the Food Supply Chain (the Food Chain 
Committee). The report extensively covers the aspects of the Norwegian grocery market 
related to the topic of this paper. However, the Food Chain Committee is also criticized for 
not thoroughly assessing the impact on competition through quantitative studies and wrongly 
defining the concept of power. Furthermore, the interviews conducted by KPMG to arrive at 
more of the information in the report are subjective expressions, which one cannot know the 
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motives of. As such, these statements may not provide an accurate description of the market 
situation.  
 
Several other reports are drawn upon. Some further describes the Norwegian market whereas 
others assesses the situation abroad, e.g. in the UK, Australia and Sweden. Furthermore, 
publications from recognized institutes in Norway are used to collect data. The full list of 
sources is found in the reference list.  
 
The calculations of the profitability ratios are built on objective information from the market 
participants’ financial statements, i.e. the groups to which the four umbrella chains belong. 
The main concerns about the use of these financial statements are that it is not possible with 
the public information available to disaggregate the numbers to derive at those solely 
connected to the grocery retailing activities of the firms. Furthermore, the detail level of what 
is included in revenues and costs of the four groups are restricted to what can be found in the 
annual reports. Also, the actual terms and conditions and the level of these is considered 
sensitive information and is not publicly available. Thus, the paper has attempted to isolate 
the effects of price increases on the gross profit margins of the firm in order to analyze the 
changes in the cost of goods sold relating to changes in terms and conditions of trade. A 
thorough description of this is given in section 5. 
4.3.2 External Validity 
External validity is centered on whether the findings of the case study are generalizable on an 
analytical level, i.e. whether the empirical results of the study are generalizable to a broader 
theory (Yin, 2014). 
 
The paper aims at contributing to an increased understanding of the use of terms and 
conditions of trade in the Norwegian grocery market. The single-case study conducted 
considers multiple theoretical sources of vertical restraints and bargaining power to arrive at 
its results. As such, it may provide conclusions on the implications of vertical restraints on 
competitiveness between horizontal competitors and conclusions about the effects of buyer 
power. 
4.3.3 Reliability 
Reliability is how reliable the data are, meaning that the same results and conclusions will be 
reached if the study is conducted again. Consequently, reliability considers whether the 
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collection and the analysis of the data are consistent (Yin, 2014). The concept of reliability 
implies that the research does not contain false assumptions and logic leaps (Saunders et al., 
2012). A judgment of reliability is based on the transparency of the study. Threats to 
reliability include participant and researcher error, respectively factors that alter the 
performance of the participants or the interpretations of the researcher, and participant and 
researcher bias, respectively any factors that induce a false response or that bias the 
researchers’ recording of responses. 
 
The risks of using secondary data include that the data is collected for other purposes than 
what you need, which may also influence the presentation of the data. Furthermore, the 
researcher has no control over the data quality (Saunders et al., 2012). 
 
The reasons for the researcher not conducting any surveys herself lies in that the research 
question, as it considers the market at the national level, would require interviews with all 
four major market participants and a large number of suppliers to best assess the situation. 
The amount of information needed is considered too extensive within the limits of this paper. 
Additionally, KPMG conducted such interviews on behalf of the 2011 Food Chain Committee 
and the researcher has thus decided to build on those findings and supplement with 
information that has emerged later in time. The market situation in Norway today is 
extensively covered in several reports and publications, as well as being frequently described 
and discussed in media. Both the proposed cooperation between NorgesGruppen and Ica from 
2013 (Ica Norge, 2013) and Coop’s recent acquisition of Ica can be said to have brought new 
life to the debate on the market situation. Thus, more information is regularly available. As 
such, the best assessment of the market situation is considered achieved by combining these 
sources. 
 
The paper is built on qualitative research but the findings are supported by quantitative data to 
draw conclusions based on the research question and the propositions. The quantitative 
material consists of profitability ratios calculated on the basis of financial statements from the 
four major participants in the Norwegian grocery market (NorgesGruppen, Reitangruppen, 
Coop Norge and Ica Norge). 
 
The financial statements of NorgesGruppen, Reitangruppen, Coop and Ica Norge are retrieved 
from the database RavnInfo (www.ravninfo.no). The numbers of each year are crosschecked 
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with the annual reports of the four groups, found on their respective webpages. Where any 
deviations have been found, the numbers of the groups’ financial statements have been used. 
The crosschecking has allowed for a control of any mistakes made by third parties but has 
also restricted the errors on the side of the researcher with regards to typing or 
misclassifications. The numbers conducted from the financial reports are found in Appendix 
C. 
 
The data on prices, used to isolate the effect of price increases in the gross profit margin, are 
also secondary information. The prices are historical numbers and consequently a collection 
by the researcher herself would not have been possible. The products chosen are based on an 
extensive dataset from VGs publications over the time period, found in the digital archive 
VG-arkivet (www.arkivet.vg.no) in addition to extensive collections from Dinside 
(www.dinside.no) when VG’s publications have lacked information.  
 
A further evaluation of the data used is found under the data presentation in section 5. 
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5 Data Presentation 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact terms and conditions have on the 
competitiveness of the individual grocery retailers and on the relative competitiveness of the 
four market participants. However, the actual agreements that the umbrella chains are able to 
obtain from negotiations with suppliers are considered sensitive information. Consequently, 
there are little to no public data available about the actual size of the different discounts, 
bonuses and lump-sum payments that have been found to exist in the Norwegian grocery 
market. Nevertheless, with the available information we can draw conclusions on the firms’ 
level of terms and conditions relative to each other and changes over the time period 
evaluated. 
 
An indication of how terms and conditions of trade affect the competitiveness of a retailer is 
to be found through the retailer’s gross margin. The gross profit margin exhibits the 
percentage of revenue that is left to the firm after it has paid the expenses directly related to 
the goods sold. Changes in gross profit margin can be due to changes in sales prices or costs. 
By isolating the changes in sales prices above the increase that we would expect due to 
inflation (i.e. the consumer price index for food and non-alcoholic beverages), we can draw 
conclusions on the impact terms and conditions of trade have on the gross profit margins of 
the four umbrella chains and eventually the impact on competitiveness. These conclusions are 
based on that the changes in the gross profit margin come from other sources than sales price; 
hence the changes in the margin must be related to changes in the terms and conditions of 
trade.  
 
The isolation of the sales price can be achieved by looking at changes in the total price for a 
basket of the umbrella chains’ products. This will be explained more in detail in section 5.2.  
Sales revenues, other revenues, cost of goods sold and other costs, which are used to calculate 
the gross and operating profit margins of the firms, are collected from the four umbrella 
chains’ financial reports. These numbers are explained in section 5.3 and the full dataset is 
exhibited in Appendix C. 
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5.1 Profit Margins 
Profit margins show a firm’s ability to turn sales into profits. It is a suitable measure for 
determining performance, showing how well a firm utilizes its resources to generate profits. 
The margins as percentages can be compared at a cross-sectional, an inter-temporal or an 
aspiration level. This means between companies in the same industry, over time for the same 
business unit and against targets respectively (Hamberg, 2014). This paper is concerned with 
the first two levels. 
 
In this paper the gross profit margin and the operating profit margin are calculated. The gross 
profit margin shows the percentage of revenue that is left to the firm after it has paid the 
expenses directly related to the goods sold. The operating profit margin shows the firm’s 
profit relative to revenues, hence is a measure to show how efficiently the firm controls its 
operating costs (Hamberg, 2014). The operating profit margin is suitable for measuring the 
relative profitability of firms within the same industry, as it does not take into consideration 
differences between the firms’ equity structure (the Swedish Competition Authority, 2011). 
 
Calculations  
 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠  𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 =    !"#$%  !"#"$%"  –!"#$  !"  !""#$  !"#$  !"#$%  !"#"$%"  
 𝑂𝑃𝑀 =   !"#$%&'()  !"#$%&  !"#$%  !"#"$%"     
 
The gross margin is calculated on the basis of sales revenue and cost of goods sold. If we 
experience a change in the gross profit margin, the following scenarios can have happened: 
 
(1) Sales price has increased (decreased) and cost of goods sold has decreased (increased). 
(2) Sales price has increased (decreased) and cost of goods sold has increased (decreased) 
with different amounts, alternatively one of the variables has not changed (no increase 
or decrease) whereas the other has. 
 
57 	  
In case 1 the margin will definitively improve (decline). In case 2 the effect on the gross profit 
margin depends on the relative strength between the change in price and the change in cost of 
goods sold. 
 
Following the matching principle of revenues and costs in accounting, regulated in both 
NGAAP and IFRS, the reported quantity of goods sold and goods purchased will be the same 
in a financial statement. Hence, we do not have to take into consideration differences in sales 
volume (quantity) but only prices and cost of goods sold. 
 
When the direct effect from changes in sales price is isolated, the remaining changes in the 
gross profit margin will stem from other variables affecting the margin, i.e. the terms and 
conditions of trade that the firm is able to obtain that influence the cost of goods sold. Hence, 
we are able to determine a change in the level of terms and conditions of trade.  
 
Comparing the changes in the gross profit margin with the changes in the operating profit 
margin, we can draw conclusions on the effectiveness of the firm’s operations. The changes in 
operating profit margin may come from three sources:  
 
(1) Changes in the prices charged to end-consumers 
(2) Changes in the prices paid to suppliers 
(3) Changes in other operating costs 
 
If the gross profit margin indicates that the firm has improved its terms and conditions of 
trade over the period, we would also expect the firm to improve its operating profit margin. 
However, if the change in operating profit margin differs from the expected this means that 
there has been a change in the efficiency of the firm, i.e. we observe changes due to source 
three (3). We are not able to point to the actual causes of these changes but are able to 
conclude on whether other variables than terms and conditions of trade have influenced the 
firm.  
 
In this paper the base year to which we compare the development in average price and 
margins is 2005. However, for Ica 2010 is chosen as the base year. Being part of the Swedish 
group Ica Gruppen AB, Ica Norge is not obliged to consolidate all its subsidiaries in its 
financial statements. Consequently, previous to 2009 several important subsidiaries were 
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solely represented as “investments in subsidiaries” and publicly available information through 
financial statements is not comparable with later years. However, in 2009 these subsidiaries 
were merged with Ica Norge AS to simplify the group’s structure and facilitate economics of 
scale (Ica Norge, 2010). Following these mergers the financial statements of Ica Norge are 
more representative of the grocers operations. 
 
Below are exhibited the total sales revenue and total operating costs of the four umbrella 
chains. Additionally figures 5.1 and 5.2 exhibit each chain’s share of sales revenue to their 
total revenue and the share of cost of goods sold to their total costs respectively.  
 
 Ica Coop Reitangruppen NorgesGruppen 
Total revenue 15,688 31,468 58,957 67,396 
Total operating costs 16,539 31,412 55,916 65,122 
Table 5.1. Sales revenue and total operating costs of the four umbrella chains in 2013. Based on financial 
statements. 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Operating revenue of the four umbrella chains in 2013.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Operating costs of the four umbrella chains in 2013.  
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5.2 Price Collection 
The analysis of the price changes relative to the base year is conducted by using price 
comparisons from VGs Matbørs3, supported by comparisons conducted by Dinside in those 
years where the VG is lacking more comparable products. Both VGs price comparisons and 
those of Dinside have been conducted over several years and are considered a reliable 
indicator on the prices that can be found in Norwegian grocery stores. To be able to present 
the most reliable estimates of the prices, the same products have been compared from year to 
year. Over the time period a total of 15 products were identical. A larger number of products 
would possibly raise the validity of the calculations, however, for comparability it is 
important to be able to calculate the price of the same products over the time period rather 
than using different kinds of market baskets. The trend is still expected to be the same due to 
the types of products chosen. The exhaustive list of products represented in the comparisons 
is found in Appendix A. 
 
The products are drawn from several different categories so as to approximate an average 
basket of goods sold. In 2007, 2009 and 2011 more of the comparable products were not 
found in the tests, consequently the years are left out of the comparison. This exclusion will 
however not have an impact on the final results, as the conclusions are drawn by comparing 
the final year of 2013 relative to the base year of 2005. In these years, all products and prices 
are represented for each of the individual chains. 
 
For each umbrella chain the price change is found by averaging the prices found at each of the 
tested chains under the respective umbrella brands. For Reitangruppen these prices are solely 
collected from Rema, hence the average market basket of Reitangruppen is built on the prices 
found in Rema stores. For the other three market participants the prices are calculated on the 
basis of two to three different chains under their respective umbrella brands. The average 
market basket price each year is thus based on more concept chains’ prices to better reflect 
that the umbrella chains operate within different segments. The chains included in the 
comparisons can be found in Appendix A and the calculation of average prices is found in 
Appendix B. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Verdens Gang AS (VG) is a Norwegian media company producing Norway’s most-read newspaper on all 
platforms (paper, web, cell phone, iPad). It is a party-politically and financially independent newspaper, 
covering news from the whole of Norway. VGs Matbørs is a price comparison of a large number of comparable 
products from the leading retail chains in Norway. The comparisons have been conducted since the early 2000s. 
The products compared are base products representing the daily consumption of Norwegian consumers 
(www.arkivet.vg.no). 
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The consumer price index (CPI) for food and non-alcoholic beverages (hereafter referred to as 
the CPI), retrieved from Statistics Norway (SSB, 2014) must be subtracted from the price 
change. The CPI of food products and the CPI of non-alcoholic beverages is weighted equally 
to derive at this CPI, as exhibited by table 5.2. One would expect a price change both in 
retailers’ sales price and in purchasing costs in line with this CPI. Therefore, changes in price 
higher or lower than this suggest an increase or decrease in the margin stemming from price 
changes at chain level. Tables 5.3 through 5.6 exhibit the price of the average market basket 
of each of the four umbrella chains from 2005 as well as the change in the price relative to 
2005. Table 5.7 summarizes the difference between the increases in CPI relative to 2005 and 
the increases in price relative to 2005, i.e. the isolated effect of prices on the gross profit 
margin. 
 2005 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013 
CPI Food (1998 = 100) 107 110 119 121 119 122 
CPI Non-alcoholic 
beverages (1998 = 100) 
103 107 115 130 138 144 
Weighted average 105 108.5 117 125.5 128.5 133 
Change relative to 2005 0% 3.3% 11.4% 19.5% 22.4% 26.7% 
Change relative to 2010 N/A N/A N/A 0% 2.4% 6% 
Table 5.2. The development of the CPI of food and the CPI of non-alcoholic beverages. The weighted 
average of the two CPIs and the percentage change in the CPI relative to 2005.  (CPIs collected from SSB, 
2014). 
 
 
ICA 2005 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013 
Prices 232.5 210.4 252.1 280.3 304.4 330.3 
Change relative 
to 2005 
0% -9.5% 8.4% 15.3% 30.9% 42.1% 
Change relative 
to 2010 
N/A N/A N/A 0.0% 8.6% 17.8% 
Table 5.3. Ica’s average market basket and the percentage change in the price of the basket relative to 
2005.  
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Coop 2005 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013 
Prices 221.3 209.5 269.9 277.4 335.7 293.1 
Change relative 
to 2005 
0% -5.4% 21.9% 25.3% 51.6% 32.4% 
Table 5.4. Coop’s average market basket and the percentage change in the price of the basket relative to 
2005.  
 
 
Reitangruppen 2005 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013 
Prices 203.4 195.7 245.3 260.5 287.5 276.9 
Change relative 
to 2005 
0% -3.8% 20.6% 28.1% 41.3% 36.1% 
Table 5.5. Rema’s average market basket and the percentage change in the price of the basket relative to 
2005.  
 
 
NorgesGruppen 2005 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013 
Prices 229.8 208.2 266.4 289.8 304.6 303.1 
Change relative 
to 2005 
0% -9.4% 16.0% 26.1% 32.6% 31.9% 
Table 5.6. NorgesGruppen’s average market basket and the percentage change in the price of the basket 
relative to 2005.  
 
 
 2005 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013 
Ica (from 2010) N/A N/A N/A 0.0% 6.2% 11.8% 
Coop 0.0% -8.7% 10.5% 5.8% 29.3% 5.7% 
Reitangruppen 0.0% -7.1% 9.2% 8.6% 19.0% 9.4% 
NorgesGruppen 0.0% -12.7% 4.5% 6.6% 10.2% 5.2% 
Table 5.7. Summary table of the difference between changes in CPI (table 5.2) and the changes in the 
price of the average market basket of each of the four umbrella chains (table 5.3 through 5.6). 
 
5.3 Financial Statements 
The calculations of the profit margins are based on numbers found in the financial statements 
of the four umbrella chains. The financial statements applied in this paper are those of the 
groups to which the four umbrella chains belong, i.e. NorgesGruppen ASA, Reitangruppen, 
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Coop Norge SA and Ica Norge AS. The financial statements are applied from 2005 through 
2013, expect for Ica Norge AS due to the reasons explained in section 5.1. It is not ideal that 
the period of analysis is shortened for Ica, however, the financial statements available before 
2009 are not comparable to those of later years. A consolidation of the statements of the 
individual subsidiaries could have been possible, but these subsidiaries’ statements are not 
available. As such it is considered better to analyze the firm based on the statements from 
2010 to give a more accurate picture of the situation in Ica. The price trend will be the same, 
but weaker, as exhibited by table 5.3. 
 
The groups conduct other business activities than solely the sales of grocery products, as 
presented in section 3. Though including the other segments under which the groups operate 
may alter the precision of the calculations, the conclusions are not expected to deviate from 
those that would be found if the grocery retailing activities were separated. This is due to that 
all four groups operate within much of the same business areas and grocery retailing is the 
core business activity in all groups. Hence, the predominant part of revenues and costs of the 
groups stem from their grocery operations. 
 
The alternative numbers to be used would be those of the umbrella chains’ operations alone, 
i.e. solely the grocery retail activity. These numbers are however not publicly available. 
Moreover, the activities of the group as a whole are expected to influence the way the 
umbrella chains are operated. A major part of the costs of the group will be necessary to 
maintain the operations of the grocery segment as well. This is supported by Rustad (2008), 
which states that the distribution of grocery sales between different store types and wholesaler 
links in practice makes it impossible to separate solely grocery retail activities.  
 
Procurement in each umbrella chain is conducted centrally. The chains’ bargaining power is 
expected to increase with the relatively higher quantities they are able to negotiate over. 
Therefore, it is important that these differences are considered when analyzing the impact of 
terms and conditions of trade on competitiveness. NorgesGruppen operates both within the 
convenience and food service industry; hence the increased quantity of which they are able to 
negotiate over will of course affect the terms of all its business areas. Also Reitangruppen has 
operations within convenience. Consequently, the groups financial statements may in this 
regard present a better picture than the operations alone of the actual terms and conditions that 
they are able to obtain. 
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The different groups also operate with a different amount of franchises and wholly owned 
stores. Reitangruppen is a franchisor whereas Coop is solely operating wholly owned 
retailers. Both Ica and NorgesGruppen operate with both forms of ownership. The accounting 
for franchises differs between the firms. The effects of different forms of ownership are 
considered outside the scope of this paper.  
 
Reitangruppen in its financial statements reports that marketing revenue and other revenue 
(classified under other operating expenses) are joint marketing. Thus, these revenues are 
reclassified to sales revenues. The other firms do not report any such reasons for 
reclassifications.  
 
Table 3.2 shows the total overview of which suppliers the groups have ownership stakes in as 
of 2013. Reitangruppen and NorgesGruppen produce a part of their private label products 
themselves through Reitan Industrier and Unil respectively.  
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6 Analysis 
Section 6.1 identifies the vertical restraints used in the Norwegian grocery market and 
determines which restraints that will most likely influence the competitiveness among the 
grocery retailers. Vertical restraints may create barriers of expansion due to differences in 
which terms and conditions market participant are able obtain. Moreover, vertical restraints 
may reduce intrabrand competition, thus softening competition between the competitors and 
facilitating coordination practices. Based on the identification of vertical restraints in section 
6.1, the remaining sections analyze the impact of such vertical restraints on the 
competitiveness of the individual market participants and their relative competitiveness. 
Section 6.3 is especially concerned with buyer power and how this concept influences the 
competitiveness of retailers.  
6.1 Terms and Conditions of Trade in the Norwegian Grocery Market 
As explained in section 2 there are several restraints identified in the literature that can be 
used to influence terms and conditions of trade in the grocery market, including slotting 
allowances, threats of delisting, joint marketing agreements and other fees and monetary 
transfers between supplier and retailer. The aim of this section is to answer the research 
question of which terms and conditions of trade that are found in the Norwegian grocery 
market. This means identifying the vertical restraints mentioned above and evaluate which 
restraints that are most likely to have effects on the competitiveness of the market participants 
at retail level. Lastly, a theoretical consideration of the use of vertical restraints is applied 
through Shaffer’s (1991) model of slotting allowances. 
6.1.1 The Negotiations  
All negotiations in the Norwegian grocery market take place during the fall, in a period 
known as the fall hunt (Høstjakta). In large, access to the market is decided by the four 
umbrella chains due to their control with procurement, wholesale and distribution functions. 
The complexity of the negotiations is determined on the number of bargaining levels, 
calculations in the negotiations, calculations of transfer prices, the ease of tracking the money 
flows and how predictable the retailers are concerning different bonuses (Ministry of 
Agriculture and Food, 2011). According to the Food Chain Committee (2011) the most 
important aspects of the negotiations are acceptance into the product range of the discounters 
KIWI, REMA 1000, Rimi and Prix. This is not surprising, considering the market share of the 
discount segment, cf. figure 3.5. 
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There are different opinions regarding how negotiations are conducted, i.e. their fairness. 
Several suppliers describe the negotiations as demanding and claim that the umbrella chains 
unilaterally draw up the agreements (Ministry of Agriculture and Food, 2011). Suppliers are 
semiannually allowed to propose price changes, however, it is claimed that it is difficult to get 
these adjustments accepted, even though they may be caused by higher commodity prices and 
be rationally explained by increased cost levels (Ministry of Agriculture and Food, 2011).  
 
NorgesGruppen is considered the least transparent and most complex negotiator. The 
umbrella chain is reported to have two different bargaining levels and additional adjustments 
at the local level: the concept chains’ range is determined in consultation with 
NorgesGruppen centrally and the use of joint marketing is determined in consultation with the 
three branches KIWI, Meny/Ultra and Kjøpmannshuset. Additionally, NorgesGruppen’s 
system differs in that its discounts and bonuses are calculated on the basis of its transfer price 
from wholesaler to chain rather than being based on the unit price from supplier. This makes 
it harder for suppliers in knowing which level their bonuses must be on in order to be 
accepted. However, NorgesGruppen claims the system is designed to secure internal 
competition between its concept chains. REMA 1000, Coop and Ica each have only one 
bargaining level. However, Coop and Ica make certain adjustments to their different concept 
chains (KPMG, 2011). The final agreements between the umbrella chains and the largest 
suppliers are supervised by the Competition Authority (the Norwegian Competition 
Authority, 2009b). Other than that there is little insight into the process that determines the 
grocery retail offer of the coming year. 
Based on the description above the negotiations emerge as confusing and unpredictable for 
several suppliers, indicating that they do not have sufficient control over the outcomes. 
6.1.2 Main Vertical Restraints  
There seems to be agreement between researchers that the system of different vertical 
restraints employed in the market is quite complex. The Food Chain Committee (2011) found 
there to be three variables on which supplier and retailer negotiate: the unit price of the 
product (listing price), discounts directly connected to the product and other bonuses 
irrespective of the product, including cooperation bonuses and innovation and project 
bonuses. The bonuses take the form of different monetary transfers and the umbrella chains 
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control their use. Joint marketing was considered the most important bonus (Ministry of 
Agriculture and Food, 2011). Moreover, joint marketing arrangements were among the first 
identified vertical restraints when investigation of such practices in Norway started around 
2005 (Dulsrud & Beckstrøm, 2005). Therefore, in this paper joint marketing agreements will 
be the main restraint in focus. 
 
Dulsrud and Beckstrøm (2005) identified joint marketing arrangements to consist of different 
variables. Based on interviews they constructed a so-called “joint-marketing package”, as 
exhibited in figure 6.1 below. The researchers point out that the package is solely meant to 
increase the understanding of the concept of joint marketing and is not intended to be the only 
possible explanation of what joint marketing arrangements are. Based on the report of the 
Food Chain Committee (2011) and the interviews conducted by KPMG (2011) the package 
still seems to give a valid picture of what we expect to find in the Norwegian market today. 
Also Gabrielsen (2010) considers joint marketing as a generic term of different activities 
conducted collusively by suppliers and retailers. 
 
 
Figure 6.1. The joint marketing package. Adopted from Dulsrud and Beckstrøm (2005). 
 
As exhibited in figure 6.1 joint marketing arrangements consist of four main variables: 
slotting allowances, listing fees, activities and category management. To review, slotting 
allowances are payments from suppliers to retailers for access to shelf space (Foros & Kind, 
2008) and listing fees are fees paid to be eligible for acceptance into the product range of 
retailers (Clarke et al., 2002). Category management is a cooperation between supplier and 
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retailer where certain product categories are operated as separate business units (Dulsrud & 
Beckstrøm, 2005). Category management will not be analyzed in this paper. 
 
To fulfill the aims of this paper, the focus will be on slotting allowances and the different 
activities that retailers conduct on behalf of and in cooperation with suppliers. The available 
information from reports over the last years suggest that listing fees and threats of delisting is 
important to credibly signal the seriousness and intention of which terms and conditions the 
retailers seek to obtain, hence they will be considered for this intention.  
 
The Use of Joint Marketing 
According to the qualitative investigation by KPMG (2011) the joint marketing fee is mainly 
paid upfront based on estimated sales and for some suppliers it is adjusted at year-end based 
on actual performance. The fee is found to be between 0% and 11% of gross sales price to 
retailer. However, differences between suppliers are expected to occur based on their relative 
size and sales value for the retailer. The smaller and less powerful retailers are found to pay 
about 15-20% of gross sales price as a joint marketing fee. 
 
The joint marketing agreements is criticized for being more of a profit transfer than a payment 
for certain services, i.e. suppliers claim that they pay an excess price compared to what they 
actually gain from the arrangement. Consequently, retailers are expected to receive financial 
benefits that exceed their costs of conducting the service. This excess should therefore be 
reflected in the margins of the retailers. 
 
Moreover, suppliers claim that the following year the retailer considers the fee as the baseline, 
meaning that the retailer demands a lump sum based on previous years. If the suppliers expect 
any marketing efforts to be conducted over the following year, additional payments must be 
made (KPMG, 2011). This aspect of the negotiations suggests that the excess payments from 
joint marketing fees should increase from year to year. Should there be differences in what 
kind of arrangements the retailers are able to obtain, this baseline may work to further 
increase the gap in terms and conditions between retailers, eventually distorting competition. 
 
There are also suppliers that believe that they gain from the agreements. According to 
KPMG’s (2011) statements these suppliers produce brands that are important frequency 
generators or products on which the chains aggressively compete on price. Retailers have no 
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choice but to include these products in their product range, hence it is more likely that the 
relative bargaining power of these suppliers are stronger. Consequently, the terms they are 
able to negotiate will be expected to be more in line with what the services are actually worth.  
 
From the chains’ side the joint marketing fee is considered both a payment for marketing and 
a discount. Some chains claim that it is the suppliers that want to hide the level of payments 
they make to retailers (KPMG, 2011). If this is the case, the suppliers’ need for less 
transparency may indicate that the payments differ between the chains. It may then be in the 
interest of suppliers to keep the actual amount hidden, so as not to reveal their bargaining 
limits and be able to sustain their bargaining power towards the chains. This argument is 
partly supported by Dulsrud and Beckstrøm (2005). Some of their informants claimed that 
access to competitors’ agreements was easily obtainable and the joint marketing agreements 
are a mean to conceal the actual relationship between retailer and supplier. 
 
Chains do also claim that there will not be a 1:1 relationship between the joint marketing fee 
and the reciprocities. This is because the restraint will also be used to increase store traffic, 
which is expected to benefit suppliers indirectly (KPMG, 2011). However, as Bogen (2008) 
points out, if all chains adopt the practice of using joint marketing fees to generate sales the 
effect for the individual supplier will be lost. Moreover, due to the nature of grocery products 
customers will visit stores irrespectively of advertising. The only way to influence store traffic 
is then to differentiate on variables important for customer choice, and not on an overarching 
level. All suppliers are likely aware of this, hence it does seem as if retailers are able to 
impose less favorable terms on suppliers than one would expect under perfect competition. 
 
NorgesGruppen was identified as the market participant that has been advocating for 
increasing the use of joint marketing arrangements. Following NorgesGruppen’s lead, the 
other market participants have increased their use of the restraint as well. Ica was recognized 
as the most transparent in terms of identifying how the restraint is employed. The practice of 
follow-up by the chains is also found to differ on chain level. Some retailers have been found 
to conduct and follow detailed plans, whereas other retailers at year-end ask to transfer the 
practices to the following year (KPMG, 2011). Hence, there are indications that the retailers 
do not necessarily feel particularly committed to the agreement and that the payment is more 
of a profit transfer than an exchange of services. 
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The Effects on Competition  
Joint marketing is by the Chicago school of thought found to be facilitating the optimal level 
of marketing efforts between two parties. The efforts unfold in regards to promotion as well 
as a measure to signal the supplier’s beliefs about the success of its product and reduce 
information asymmetries. Especially for a new product introduction, the bonus is seen as a 
way to divide the risks of sales omissions (risk sharing). 
 
The Norwegian grocery market is neither at retail level nor upstream in the supply chain 
perfectly competitive, but rather oligopolistic, and as such it is expected to exist information 
asymmetries. Information from the qualitative investigations of Dulsrud and Beckstrøm 
(2005) and KPMG (2011), as well as the highly concentrated nature of the market, do 
however indicate that retailers are aware of which suppliers that exist in the market and that 
retailers are in the position of reviewing suppliers’ reliability. Dulsrud and Beckstrøm (2005) 
also assert that the import restrictions on several grocery products contribute to reducing the 
effects of the screening due to an overweighing amount of Norwegian suppliers. This 
assertion is justified by the limited number of suppliers in the market, which likely reduces 
the probability of unreliable market participants. Consequently, there is little evidence of 
information asymmetries existing in the Norwegian grocery market and there must be other 
reasons for the use of joint marketing in the industry, i.e. due to risk sharing or profit transfer. 
 
The anticompetitive effects of vertical restraints can be summarized in the following ways: 
restraints may facilitate cooperation practices and dampen competition, and vertical restraints 
may raise rivals’ costs (the Norwegian Competition Authority, 2005). Each of these strategic 
effects will be exemplified below through the use of slotting allowances and Shaffer’s model 
(1991).  
 
Slotting allowances can reduce price competition between competitors at retail level. Should 
chain 1 demand a slotting allowance it is expected that the supplier will increase the 
wholesale price as long as it earns profits equal to or greater than zero. An increase in 
wholesale price will be directly transferred to end-user price but suppliers will compensate 
retailers’ loss of sale through the slotting allowance. In equilibrium, the increased price to 
end-consumer charged by chain 1 will induce chain 2 to increase its price as well (best 
response), however, not with as much as chain 1. Should however both chain 1 and 2 demand 
slotting allowances from suppliers, both chains can raise prices above that of the equilibrium 
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of only one chain. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 exhibit these effects. The use of the slotting allowance 
signal to competitors that the chain will increase its prices (due to the increase in marginal 
cost) and thus competition between retailers is reduced (Shaffer, 1991).  
 
Additionally, the use of slotting allowances can reduce the number of products offered in the 
grocery stores. Drawing on the Norwegian Competition Authority (2005) retailers may gain 
from reducing the number of products through reduction in transaction costs (fewer 
negotiations, distribution links etc.). In addition, a limited product range increase the 
competition between the chains due to differentiation, especially in combination with 
differences in the product range between the umbrella chains. The price competition will 
become less intense and consequently retailers are able to increase profits and improve 
margins (the Norwegian Competition Authority, 2005). 
 
It may be that the different retailers are not able to induce on the suppliers the same amount of 
slotting allowances. Consequently, we will have a situation approximate to the one of only 
chain 1 using slotting allowances, cf. figure 2.3. Assuming that the supplier will charge the 
same wholesale price (listing price without discounts) irrespective of the slotting allowance, 
chain 2 will not be compensated as much as chain 1 for the loss of sales due to the price 
increase. In this incident the use of slotting allowances will raise rivals’ costs and we will 
observe differences in retailers margins. 
 
The assumption behind Shaffer’s model (1991) is that the contracts are observable between 
the umbrella chains and the contracts are irreversible. Additionally, the chains must set prices 
based on marginal costs.  
 
Observable contracts in the Norwegian grocery market are to some extent satisfied in that the 
different agreements are relatively well known. However, as the slotting allowance is 
considered a part of the joint marketing package and joint marketing is criticized for 
concealing some of the transfers between retailers and suppliers, the assumption is not as 
clear. The question becomes how much information is needed for competitors to believe they 
will gain from the strategic effect of the allowance. If it is sufficient to know that slotting 
allowances are used and the fees’ approximate size, we will expect reduced competition in the 
market due to slotting allowances. If rivals need more accurate information to be able to 
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reduce price competition, it is less likely that the use of the slotting allowance will not distort 
competition. 
 
The assumption of irreversible contracts is necessary when wholesale prices are determined 
prior to the pricing game between retailers. In the Norwegian market the agreements are 
foremost negotiated annually during the fall hunt. Semiannual price adjustments are possible 
but are considered harder to obtain. Therefore the agreements are considered to be relatively 
stable.  
 
Lastly, it must be assessed whether the chains set prices based on marginal cost. According to 
the Norwegian Competition Authority (2005) the chains base end-consumer prices on both 
lump-sum payments and marginal cost. Hence, the price is set based on an average price 
rather than marginal costs alone. Moreover, the prices in the market are to a large degree 
assumed to be determined with respect to what competitors charge (the Norwegian 
Competition Authority, 2005). This is supported by the widely used practice of price 
comparisons and collections conducted by different stakeholders, as discussed in section 
3.3.1. Furthermore, the margins of individual products are expected to differ widely across the 
product range due to the adjustments to competitors’ prices (the Norwegian Competition 
Authority, 2005). Some products are even sold at a loss in order to increase store sales, a 
practice known as below-cost selling (Clarke et al., 2002). In the Norwegian market 
especially diapers have been prone to such practices (Larsen-Vonstett & Backe, 2004; 
Brynsrud & Strømsheim, 2011).  
 
In sum it can be concluded that the contracts in the Norwegian grocery market are irreversible 
but whether the contracts are observable depend on how much in-depth knowledge the 
competitiors need about the agreement to react with higher prices. It cannot be expected that 
end-consumer prices are set based on marginal cost, as prices in the market are found to be 
based both on lump-sum payments and on competitors’ prices. 
6.1.3 Conclusion About the Use of Vertical Restraints 
Joint marketing arrangements are in the Norwegian grocery market mainly criticized for not 
being used to their intention but increasingly being a profit transfer from supplier to retailer.  
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The Chicago school of thought considers the use of joint marketing as a way to optimize the 
level of marketing efforts of suppliers and retailers. This is on the costs of advertising, but 
also on sharing the risks of failure of new product introductions and as a reduction of 
information asymmetry. Due to the concentrated upstream and downstream market in the 
food supply chain, the information asymmetry is considered low. Thus, there must be other 
reasons than screening that explains the use of vertical restraints in the market. 
 
As the possible deviating use of the joint marketing arrangement is known in the market, 
suppliers are naturally aware of the possible consequences of agreeing to such a vertical 
restraint. Depending on the bargaining power of the retailers, we thus expect suppliers to be 
reluctant towards such a payment as long as they are not credibly threatened to pay. These 
threats may come to light in termination of contracts. However, smaller retailers are assumed 
to have less bargaining power and as such can not dictate these terms in the same way as 
larger retailers. This is expected to be reflected in differences in the retailers’ margins and will 
be considered below in relation to the waterbed effect in section 6.3.3. 
 
6.2 Margin Analysis 
The Norwegian grocery retail market is oligopolistic, characterized by a few competing firms 
and substantial entry barriers. The restricted availability of information on prices and product 
quality are limited to the extent of specific negotiations and agreements between suppliers and 
retailers. End-consumer prices are relatively easily observable through price comparisons and 
other collections conducted by different stakeholders. Section 2.4 explained that oligopolistic 
markets are highly sensitive to strategic decisions as the participants will be both affected by 
and react to changes of other firms. Consequently, it is expected that the relative level of 
terms and conditions between the market participants will influence the relative 
competitiveness of the firms. 
 
The following section presents the margin analysis of the four market participants by use of 
the method explained in section 5. The analysis provides insight into the level of terms and 
conditions of all market participants. The relative competitiveness between the four due to 
differences in terms and conditions of trade is analyzed below. 
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6.2.1 Analysis of the Different Umbrella Chains 
Table 6.1 presents the price changes, gross profit margin changes and operating profit margin 
changes relative to 2005. All market participants have increased their prices; however, the 
effects on gross and operating profit margin differ considerably between the four.  
 
 
Table 6.1. Change in prices and gross profit margin relative to base year. Operating profit margin in 
absolute terms. 
 
Ica 
Relative to 2010 Ica has increased its prices with more (11.8%) than we can expect from 
inflation (i.e. CPI). In isolation we would thus expect the gross margin of Ica to increase over 
the period as well, however the firm’s gross profit margin has declined. Therefore, we can 
conclude that Ica has experienced a worsening of their terms and conditions of trade over the 
time period. We cannot conclude on whether their terms and conditions of trade were poor in 
2010, but the observations imply that Ica’s terms and conditions are worse by 2013.  
 
Due to the decrease in gross profit margin we will in isolation also expect a decrease in the 
operating profit margin of Ica. As exhibited in table 6.1, this decrease is considerably larger 
than the decrease in the gross profit margin alone (almost doubling their negative profit over 
the period); hence we can conclude that Ica is also running its operations less efficiently in 
2013 than in the base year of 2010. We do not know what cause these changes, but due to the 
large deviation between the changes in gross margin and changes in operating profit margin 
other costs must have increased considerably.  
Coop 
Compared to the base year of 2005, Coop has increased its prices relative to what we would 
expect from the CPI. Hence, we would also expect Coop’s gross profit margin to increase. 
This increase is rather extensive, indicating that Coop over the analyzed period has been able 
to improve its terms and conditions of trade. 
 
 
Ica Coop Reitangruppen NorgesGruppen 
2010 2013 2005 2013 2005 2013 2005 2013 
Price change 0% 11.8% 0% 5.7% 0% 9.4% 0% 5.2% 
Gross margin change 0% -12.4% 0% 36.8% 0% -14.9% 0% 12.6% 
Operating profit margin -3.3% -6.0% 0.2% 0.2% 4.6% 5.2% 3.0% 3.5% 
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The operating profit margin of Coop in 2013 is unchanged relative to its operating profit 
margin in 2005. If Coop was able to employ its improved terms and conditions of trade as 
efficiently in 2013 as in 2005 we would expect the operating profit margin to increase over 
the time period. As the margin has remained at the same level it can be concluded that Coop 
is now running its operations less efficiently than in the base year. 
Reitangruppen 
From the basis year 2005 to 2013, Reitangruppen’s gross margin has decreased by about 15%. 
However, the prices that Reitangruppen operates with in 2013 have increased with more than 
what we can expect from the CPI. In isolation this price increase should have improved the 
margins of the firm. Since we however observe a reduction in the margin relative to the base 
year, the cost of goods sold that Reitangruppen is able to obtain must have increased with a 
larger amount than what their prices have done. Based on this, it is likely to assume that their 
terms and conditions in 2013 are worse relative to what they were in 2005. 
 
However, a conclusion indicating that the terms and conditions of Reitangruppen have 
worsened does not imply that the terms and conditions that they do have are poor. Their gross 
profit margin is still high as it is observed to be more than 20% (see figure 6.2). Due to the 
concept of mean reversion, we can expect that Reitangruppen after a long period of high 
margins return to a more normal level (towards the market average).  
 
The operating profit margin of Reitangruppen is improved in 2013 relative to 2005. As such, 
we can say that even though their terms and conditions of trade have worsened relative to 
2005, the group is managing to run its operations more efficiently. 
NorgesGruppen 
The prices of the average market basket of NorgesGruppen have relative to 2005 increased 
with more than we can expect based on the CPI. Due to this price increase, we would also 
expect the gross margin of the group to increase. This expectation is in line with what we 
observe. However, the change in prices relative to change in gross margin is not large enough 
to be able to draw conclusions on whether NorgesGruppen has improved its terms and 
conditions of trade as well over the period. 
 
Following the increase in gross profit margin we will also expect the operating profit margin 
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of NorgesGruppen to increase. Building on figure 6.2 we see that this is the case, however, we 
do not have grounds to conclude about whether the changes in the operating profit margin is 
related to other factors as well. In sum, it cannot be concluded that NorgesGruppen has 
experienced any changes in its competitiveness over the analyzed time period. 
Conclusions on the Different Umbrella Chains 
The analysis concludes that Ica’s terms and conditions of trade must have worsened over the 
analyzed time period, also contributing to a decline in their operating profit margin. However, 
the decline is assumed to be caused by other factors as well; hence, Ica is operating less 
efficiently in 2013 relative to 2010. Coop’s terms and conditions are expected to have 
improved relative to those that the chain had in 2005 but the firm is operating less efficiently 
in 2013. Reitangruppen’s terms and conditions are observed to have worsened; however the 
firm has managed to run its operations more efficiently in 2013 relative to 2005. 
NorgesGruppen has improved its margins relative to 2005 but we do not have grounds to 
conclude on improvements in neither terms and conditions of trade nor efficiency. 
 
6.2.2 Comparisons Between the Market Participants 
Section 6.2.1 established that over the period of 2005 through 2013 there have been some 
changes in the level of the terms and conditions of each market participant. Though we can 
draw conclusions for most participants on whether the terms and conditions of trade have 
improved or worsened over the period, it cannot be concluded on how good or bad the terms 
and conditions were initially. This section aims at further analyzing the differences found and 
the relative competitiveness of the participants based on the gross and operating profit margin 
alone. Section 6.3 will introduce the concept of buyer power to further analyze the causes of 
the observed differences. The concentrated market and oligopolistic price competition (with 
differentiated products) implies that the market participants are affected by and react to each 
other’s changes but there are also risks of tacit collusion. Consequently, a comparison with 
the operating profit margin of British and Swedish grocery retailers will be conducted. 
 
The development of the gross and operating profit margins of the four market participants are 
exhibited in figures 6.2 and 6.3.  
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Figure 6.2. Gross profit margin of the four market participants and the market average from 2005 to 
2013. Based on financial statements. 
 
 
The average gross profit margin of the market has been relatively stable over the entire time 
period. The exemption is 2008; however, the average quickly returned to about 17.5% the 
following year. From figure 6.2 we see that Coop and Reitangruppen has followed roughly 
the same trend as the average of the market. NorgesGruppen seems to have increased its 
margin at the expense of Ica, as the two are developing in opposite directions from 2010. We 
know from the calculations in the previous section 6.1.1 that Ica has reduced terms and 
conditions of trade relative to 2010. From the calculations we cannot conclude about the 
causes of the observed changes in NorgesGruppen. Consequently, no clear conclusions can be 
draw on whether the worsened terms in Ica is caused by the opposite improvements in the 
terms of NorgesGruppen. However, there are indications of the impact of different size and 
the question will be elaborated further in section 6.3.3. 
 
We could expect to see differences in gross profit margins between the market participants 
based on the extent of vertical integration. Products purchased through subsidiaries will be 
expected to have a lower premium price from supplier to retailer than those purchased in the 
open market. From section 3 we know that Reitangruppen is the market participant with the 
highest level of integration, followed by NorgesGruppen and Coop. Ica has fewer investments 
upstream in the vertical supply chain. However, it is the gross profit margin levels of Ica, 
Reitangruppen and NorgesGruppen that are considerably higher than that of Coop. The 
difference between Coop and the other participants may be grounded in that Coop is a 
consumer cooperative, thus may not have the same profit maximizing objectives as the other 
participants. Nevertheless, Ica is not deviating considerably over the period from those 
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participants that are most heavily integrated with suppliers. Thus, we cannot see any clear 
trends on whether vertical integration influences the margin.  
 
Based on section 6.1.2 suppliers claim that they are exploited to pay an excess bonus through 
the joint marketing arrangement and there are claims from suppliers that this fee will increase 
from year to year. Support of these claims should be found in generally high gross profit 
margins among the retailers. In addition, we would expect the margins to increase over time. 
The gross profit margin of the market is however relatively flat with no observable trend over 
the time period. Based on these observations we cannot say that retailers generally are able to 
excessively use joint marketing arrangements and exploit suppliers. Furthermore, Coop is the 
only market participant on which we can conclude that has improved its terms and conditions 
since 2005. However, figure 6.2 exhibits that the gross profit margin of the firm has been 
almost constant since 2009. Hence, the improvement in terms cannot be said to increase from 
year to year as suppliers claim.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.3. Operating profit margin of the four market participants and the market average from 2005 to 
2013. Based on financial statements. Please note that the numbers of Ica previous to 2009 are those conducted 
from Ica Gruppen AB (ICA AB). ICA AB’s financial statements provide information on the total sales of the 
Norwegian segment, as well as operating profit. Therefore, it is possible to derive at Ica’s operating profit 
margin over the entire time period of 2005 through 2013. 
 
Figure 6.3 exhibits the operating profit margins of the four market participants. We see that 
NorgesGruppen and Reitangruppen have margins above the market average, whereas Coop 
and Ica are below the market average. An interesting consideration in this regard is Coop’s 
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acquisition of Ica, i.e. the two weakest market participants are now combining their 
operations. An analysis of the acquisition effects will be performed under section 6.3.3. 
 
The average operating profit margin has been declining over the time period. The decline 
seems to be largely due to Ica’s significant decline over the entire time period. Coop’s 
operating profit margin has varied, but has been kept between 0.6% and 1%. In 2012 and 
2013 we observe a falling trend in the firm’s margin. 
 
Reitangruppen’s operating profit margin has been the largest over the entire period (with the 
exception of 2008). The margin varied considerably during the first half of the period but it 
seems to have stabilized around 5% from 2009. NorgesGruppen has experienced growing 
margins over the time period (slightly offset in 2008), however we observe a small decrease 
in 2013. 
 
The risk of tacit collusion is the risk that market participants “indirectly coordinate their 
production and pricing decision by observing each other’s competitive actions and responses” 
(Hoskisson, Hitt, Ireland & Harrison, 2012, p. 210), hence reduce competition. The 
probability of tacit collusion increases when the market participants have long-term 
perspectives on their operations. The Norwegian grocery retailers are considered to fulfil 
these criteria, supported by new store openings or improvement of old stores and additionally 
Coop’s acquisition of Ica. Additionally, the market shares of the participants are large and 
stable.  
 
Problems with the competition can be indicated by high profit margins over a longer period of 
time (the Swedish Competition Authority, 2011). In comparison to the operating profit margin 
of grocery retailers in comparable countries, the operating profit margins of the Norwegian 
grocery retailers cannot be said to be especially high. In their 2008 report the UK Competition 
Commission finds that the largest supermarkets have operating profit margins between 2.5% 
and 6.5% and that these margins have been relatively stable over the years of 2000-2007 (the 
time period investigated). Also the Swedish Competition Authority (2011) reports the 
operating profit margins of the largest Swedish grocery retailers to between 2.5% and 5.5%. 
Hence, the margins in Norway are largely consistent with what we can expect based on an 
international comparison with similar countries. Figure 6.4 compare the three largest grocery 
retailers in the three countries. 
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Figure 6.4. Comparison of the operating profit margin of the three largest grocery retailers in Norway, 
the UK and Sweden. Adopted from the Swedish Competition Authority (2011). Norwegian grocery retailers 
are exhibited in blue and the operating profit margins are those of 2013. The UK and Sweden are represented in 
red and green respectively, and the years are 2007 and 2009. The margins are in all countries considered to be 
relatively stable (UK Competition Commission, 2008; the Swedish Competition Authority, 2011); hence, despite 
different years the comparison can be made across the countries.  
 
Following the use of slotting allowances as presented in section 6.1.2 we would expect both 
end-consumer prices and retailers’ profit margins to be high. It is already established in 
section 3 that the prices on food and non-alcoholic beverages in the Norwegian grocery 
market are high compared to other European countries and that not all of these differences can 
be explained by taxes, fees and a generally higher cost level. As the above analysis concludes, 
there is however no indication of especially high margins in the Norwegian grocery retail 
industry. In addition, all market participants are expected to compete fiercely on price, 
especially given the importance of the discount segment. In sum, we would not expect the 
competition between retailers to be dampened because of the use of vertical restraints alone. 
 
6.3 Buyer Power in the Norwegian Grocery Market 
In section 2.2 it was established that the use of flexible contracts are more likely to occur 
when a party holds power over the other (Gabrielsen et al., 2013). From section 6.1 it is clear 
that there is evidence of use the of vertical restraints in the Norwegian grocery market through 
joint marketing agreements and it is not expected that the use of these restraints would be as 
81 	  
substantial had suppliers had countervailing more power. We do observe from previous 
sections that the relative profitability between the chains differs. To be able to assess how the 
use of restraints affect the difference in competitiveness between the umbrella chains, the 
concept of buyer power will be investigated further. This allows the paper to analyze possible 
causes relating to relative power between the market participants. The concept of buyer power 
will be evaluated by use of the bargaining model. I will first briefly explain the rationale 
behind using the bargaining model, building on Gabrielsen et al. (2013) and the assumptions 
of the monopsony model. 
Firstly, the monopsony model requires that all suppliers offer the same wholesale price to the 
retailer, namely the market price. The model assumes a perfectly competitive upstream 
market. Based on section 3 it is not likely to assume that any horizontal level in the 
Norwegian grocery industry is perfectly competitive. The second assumption is that the 
contracts are linear. The interviews conducted by Dulsrud and Beckstrøm in 2005 and by 
KPMG for the Food Chain Committee’s report in 2011 indicate differently, due to the use of 
different discounts and other payments. The third assumption of the model is that the unit 
costs of production increase. Since we observe the use of different vertical restraints it is more 
likely that the costs are decreasing. Therefore, also the third assumption of the monopsony 
model is violated. Lastly, in the monopsony model the buyer dictates the quantities bought 
and sold, thus both wholesale and end-user prices. Though there are indications of strong 
bargaining power on the buyer side, we cannot expect the umbrella chains to be able to dictate 
the terms and conditions of trade as they like. Especially is this for true for must-carry brands 
and other frequency-generating products. The market participants also compete fiercely on 
price in the end-consumer market. In sum, all assumptions of the monopsony model are 
violated. As the above analysis has indicated it is likely to assume that the retailer and 
supplier negotiate over the terms and conditions in the market to some extent. Thus, the 
bargaining model is the appropriate framework to base the analysis on. 
6.3.1 Buyer Power Framework 
Applying the buyer power framework of Clarke et al. (2002), the following section contains 
an analysis of the buyer power in the Norwegian grocery market.  
1) Is there significant buyer power?  
The preliminary question of significant buying power is the key question in investigating 
buyer power. Clarke et al. (2002) consider two factors as evidence of buyer power: one or 
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more buyers must buy a significant proportion of the product as a whole and they must be 
able to materially influence the terms negotiated. 
 
The combined market shares of the four umbrella chains in the Norwegian market are about 
96%, thus indicating a concentrated market apt to increase the buyer power of retailers. 
Another indicator that can be used to draw conclusions on buyer power is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI). The HHI is a statistical measure of market concentration. The index 
is calculated by summing the squared market shares (MS) of all market participants (i) 4: 
 
   𝐻𝐻𝐼 = 𝑀𝑆! !!!!!   
 
HHI is in line with economic theory, which claims that the fewer firms that constitute the 
market, the lower the competition will be. Hence, the higher the HHI is, the lower the 
competition in the market will be. HHI ranges from values close to 0 (many firms with small 
market shares) to 10,000 (a monopoly: 1002) (Rhodes, 1993). American competition 
authorities considers a market to be highly concentrated when HHI is larger than 2,500 (U.S. 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, 2010), whereas the European 
Commission (2004) operates with a number above 2,000. 
 
Due to the objectives of this paper the market shares of the umbrella chains are used in the 
calculations. Alternatively, HHI could have been calculated using the market shares of the 
individual concept chains, by acknowledging that each chain compete irrespectively of which 
umbrella chain they belong to (e.g. will Coop Mega compete with a Coop Extra store). The 
concentration would then have been lower. 
 
As exhibited in figure 6.5 below, the HHI of the Norwegian grocery market has been higher 
than 2,500 since the chain formations were a fact in 1993. The index has been quite stable at 
about 2,660 over the last 20 years, despite changes in participants’ market shares within the 
industry, cf. table 3.3. Consequently, the HHI indicates that the Norwegian market is highly 
concentrated and that without access to the shelves of one or more of these umbrella chains, 
suppliers are in large excluded from the market. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Please note that the individual market shares of ”other” market participants (see figure 3.4) are excluded from 
the calculations. before 1993, as those participants were small independent grocers. Ideally the HHI should be 
calculated by including all firms but as supported by the European Commission (2004, paragraph 16), ”very 
small firms may not be important because such firms do not affect the HHI significantly”. 
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Figure 6.5. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 1990–2013. (Nielsen, 2014; Nielsen, 2013, Nielsen, 2008, 
ACNielsen, 2004; Haga et al., 1997). 
 
Differences in Buyer Power Among the Market Participants 
The differences in market shares between the umbrella chains suggest that it is more 
important to be accepted by certain chains. It is likely to assume that access to 39% of the 
market through NorgesGruppen is of greater importance than solely 11% through Ica. Hence, 
it can be assumed that the suppliers will agree on less beneficial terms and conditions 
presented by NorgesGruppen. 
 
Additionally, the discount segment in Norway is very important (cf. figure 3.5). The Food 
Chain Committee (2011) revealed that acceptance into the discount stores across all umbrella 
chains is considered one of the most important aspects of the negotiations. As exhibited by 
figure 6.6, Rema (Reitangruppen) and Kiwi (NorgesGruppen) are by far the most important 
chains within this particular segment. 
 
 
Figure 6.6. Market shares within the discount segment (based on Nielsen, 2014). 
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Private labels are another important aspect to consider in relation to the materiality of each 
buyer’s influence on terms of trade. Literature suggests two ways through which private 
labels will improve the bargaining position of buyers: more alternatives to existing suppliers 
and insight into production costs. The latter is especially relevant in respect to the preliminary 
consideration of buyer power. Through knowing the cost structure of certain products the 
retailers will be better suited to know the reservation price and the bargaining limits of the 
suppliers.   
 
The share of private label products in the Norwegian grocery market is found in figure 3.9. As 
the figure exhibits, the sale of private labels has increased steadily, indicating that the relative 
buyer power of all four market participants over suppliers may have increased. The 
differences in shares of private labels on retail level seen in isolation indicate that 
Reitangruppen and Coop, which has the largest private label shares, have more buyer power 
relative to the other two. We can also expect buyer power to increase the more product 
categories a retailer has private labels in. The retailer is then able to offer more substitutes as 
well as obtain more information about cost structures of different products. Based on 
information about the types of private label products, Reitangruppen is operating with the 
most diverse private label range. Reitangruppen’s potential advantage is also supported by 
their vertical integration with several suppliers through ownership, whereas the other firms 
have more long-term agreements with external suppliers. 
 
Conclusion on the Significance of Buyer Power 
Based on the above findings it is likely to assume that there is significant buyer power across 
all umbrella chains in the Norwegian market. Suppliers have in practice no other access to 
end-consumers than through these four. However, based on the relative market shares and 
positions within the growing important discount segment, as well as private label innovations 
and ownership, it can be assumed that NorgesGruppen and Rema will have a stronger buyer 
power than the other two firms. 
2) Is buying power against relatively powerless suppliers?  
The power of suppliers is assessed through considering who dictates terms and conditions of 
trade and how the seller concentration is in the upstream market. These considerations come 
from that size in itself is not enough to generate buyer power. The retailer must also be able to 
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credibly (threaten to) shift a significant proportion of its purchasing to other suppliers (Oxera, 
2012). 
 
As explained in section 3.4 suppliers are within most categories competing with few large 
participants. Figure 3.10 showed that in 11 of the chosen categories, the three largest suppliers 
had a combined market share of more than 80% and in neither of the investigated categories 
had the three largest suppliers less than 60% market share. This evidence suggests that 
suppliers have some power, mainly due to the limited number of sourcing alternatives 
available to retailers. Consequently, suppliers can be assumed to some extent resist retailers’ 
pressure to reduce prices and admit different discounts and fees (Clarke et al., 2002). 
 
Also, the ability of retailers to dictate terms of trade varies. It is has been touched upon in 
preceding parts that the ability to resist the pressure of retailers depends on the strength of the 
supplier’s brand or that the product cannot be easily copied by the retailer. With these 
requirements in place, retailers would not be able to gain as much from using private labels to 
counteract the power of suppliers. It is outside the scope of this paper to investigate these 
aspects for individual categories of products. Nevertheless, there is assumed to be differences 
between the suppliers with regards to these aspects and suppliers of must-carry products are 
definitively possessing considerable power relative to other suppliers. 
 
At the same time, when private labels can be used they will increases the alternatives of the 
retailers and allow them to increase power. When private labels were introduced in the 1980s, 
the products were typically cheaper and of poorer quality than the national brands. However, 
over the years the product variety within the private label segments has grown. Today we can 
find products with the same quality, both to lower and equal prices as the national brands; 
hence, information about the costs of production is more easily obtainable. 
 
Conclusion on the Power of Suppliers 
We cannot expect suppliers in the Norwegian market to be powerless. Based on the Food 
Chain Committee’s report (2011) the upstream market is heavily concentrated within a large 
number of important categories. However, we can expect the power between suppliers to 
vary. The use of private labels is expected to increase the bargaining power of the retailers, 
but no clear conclusions can be drawn on the impact of what this production has to say for 
retailers’ relative power. Nevertheless, certain suppliers must be included in the chains’ 
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product range to not loose store traffic and sales, hence the suppliers cannot be claimed to be 
powerless. 
3) Does the buyer itself have significant selling power?  
This question relates to the potential selling power of a retailer in the downstream market, 
meaning its ability to dictate the end-consumer prices.  
 
Even though the competition at retail level is restricted by the number of market participants 
and there are risks of tacit collusion in the Norwegian market, it is not likely that one buyer on 
their own can increase prices considerably above those of its competitors without losing sales. 
Moreover, the discount chains compete foremost on price and given this segment’s high share 
of the market in Norway it is not likely that prices will be driven upwards due to selling 
power. Additionally, the market participants employ considerable efforts into having the 
lowest prices. Also, both Rema and Kiwi have announced their intention to be the chain with 
the lowest prices in the market (Kiwi, 2014; Reitangruppen, 2014a). This indicates that there 
is no one-sided dictation of end-consumer prices.  
4) Are there significant efficiency gains associated with buyer power?  
Drawing on the report conducted by the UK Competition Commission (2008) there are two 
possible sources to economies of scale in the grocery market: distribution costs and 
purchasing costs. The interesting effect for this paper is whether the efficiency gains from the 
terms that one retailer is able to induce on a supplier is limiting the other participants’ 
possibilities and/or relax competition between the market participants. 
 
The distribution costs are affected by quantity; meaning that a larger participant (in terms of 
volume) will be able to divide the costs of distribution over a larger amount of products, 
hence reduce the marginal cost of distribution. This effect can however be present even 
though the retailer does not possess buyer power but still operates with an efficient level of 
output. Nevertheless, the vertical integration of wholesale operations in the umbrella chains is 
considered to have increased their buyer power by further regulating the access to the market. 
 
In the relation to buyer power the obtainable purchasing costs relate to other factors outside 
the fixed quantity or negotiated per unit costs (generally all terms and conditions of trade) 
(Dobson et al., 1998). Table 5.1 and figure 5.2 exhibits the total costs and the cost of goods 
sold relative to total costs of all market participants. Cost of goods sold constitutes the major 
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part of the chains’ costs. Consequently, the cost advantages that retailers are able to obtain in 
the negotiations are extremely important for their competitiveness.  
 
In question 1 it was assessed that all four umbrella chains have some extent of buyer power. 
However, NorgesGruppen and Reitangruppen were considered to likely possess the greatest 
power due to their size on an overarching level but also due to their shares within the discount 
segment and Reitangruppen’s heavy investments in private labels and upstream suppliers. 
Both retailers have considerably higher margins than those of the other two market 
participants, cf. figure 6.2 and 6.3. However, Coop has over the time period investigated been 
able to increase its terms and conditions of trade; hence, the relatively larger margins of 
NorgesGruppen and Reitangruppen do not indicate that Coop is worse off. On the other hand, 
Ica has worse terms in 2013 relative to 2010. Also, the firm’s margins are decreasing over the 
same time period.  
 
In sum there are significant gains associated with improved terms and conditions of trade due 
to cost of goods sold constituting the major part of total costs.  
5) Does the buyer attempt to constrain its suppliers’ other actions or deliberately create a 
dependency relationship? 
Evidence of this last question is connected to retailers’ ability to impose on suppliers terms 
and conditions that are not related to the cost structure of the products.  
 
As was discussed in section 6.1 several suppliers consider the reciprocities from joint 
marketing agreements to be unidentifiable. Consequently, the use of joint marketing may 
serve as such constrain. On the other hand, based on the margin analysis in section 6.2.2 and 
comparisons to similar countries the margins of Norwegian grocery retailers are not 
particularly high. Also, the average profit margins are constant or decreasing over the time 
period, not indicating that retailers claim an unreasonable part of shared profits through the 
joint marketing arrangements found to be employed. 
Conclusion about the Buyer Power Framework 
Drawing on the analysis above there is evidence of buyer power in the Norwegian grocery 
market. NorgesGruppen and Reitangruppen are considered the participants with the strongest 
power. They are both large in terms of market shares generally as well as within the 
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particularly important discount segment. Supported by high gross margins, these two firms 
seem to some extent to be able to exploit their power in a larger degree than their competitors. 
  
6.3.2 Buyer Power and Competitiveness 
The concern of this paper with regards to buyer power is how buyer power can distort the 
horizontal competition between retailers in exaggerating differences in competitive positions. 
The section above established that there is evidence of significant buyer power among the 
retailers in the Norwegian grocery market. The following section draws on the analysis in 
section 6.3.1 and analyzes the possible consequences of this power.  
Upstream Vertical Integration 
Reitangruppen is the firm that has integrated most in the upstream vertical supply chain.  
From the gross profit margin alone we would thus expect Reitangruppen to have among the 
best terms and conditions. This is true based on previous statements, however their terms have 
worsened over the time period analyzed in section 6.2.1. The vertical integration in 
Reitangruppen is a continuous process and the firm has acquired more of the firms over the 
time period investigated here. Based on the analysis above we would expect the terms and 
conditions of trade to increase with increased vertical integration. This effect can however not 
be observed for Reitangruppen. We cannot expect Reitangruppen’s terms and conditions of 
trade to be poor, as they are known to be close to NorgesGruppen’s. Still, the observations 
indicate that upstream vertical integration do not necessarily improve the competitiveness of 
the market participant above that of the others. 
Private Label Products 
Literature suggests that private label products give retailers insight into production costs. In 
combination with an increased number of alternatives, the bargaining power of retailers is 
expected to increase as they can more credibly impose on suppliers more favorable terms and 
conditions of trade. Based on the analysis in section 6.3.1 we would expect Reitangruppen to 
obtain the best terms and conditions of trade. Again, the firm’s terms and conditions cannot 
be claimed to be poor or good, but their margins alone suggest that they are able to obtain 
rather favorable terms even though they have declined over the last years. Given that 
Reitangruppen is almost consistently winning price comparisons we expect its prices to be 
lower than those of the competitors. Hence, the costs must be considerably lower as well if 
the retailer is able to have the best margins. In combination with the vertical integration 
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analyzed above and knowing that the integrated suppliers often produce their private labels, 
Reitangruppen cannot be said to have gained this cost advantage through improved conditions 
of trade, but the higher margins might have been caused by generally more efficient 
operations. Coop should in isolation follow suit on Reitangruppen based on their private label 
investments. However, even though Coop’s terms and conditions are know to be at the same 
level as Reitangruppen’s and the terms are found to have improved over the investigated time 
period, the operating margins of Coop are much lower than those found in Reitangruppen. 
Conclusions on Buyer Power and Competitiveness 
Improvement of terms and conditions is not supported by upstream vertical integration as 
Reitangruppen, which have heavily invested in upstream suppliers over the investigated time 
period, have experienced a worsening of terms and conditions of trade by 2013. As the private 
label introductions of Reitangruppen have in a large degree been conducted simultaneously 
with the upstream integration, increasing the outside alternatives cannot be concluded to 
improve terms and conditions of trade. On the other hand, Coop, which is the firm with the 
second largest amount of private labels, has achieved improvements over the time period. 
6.3.3 Buyer Size 
Because of the lack of clarity and conclusiveness in the economic literature on the issue of 
relative buyer power and size, the Australian Competition Commission (2008) asserts that the 
impact on other retailers of a larger retailer’s buyer power will need to be assessed on the 
basis of the particular factual evidence. In the following section, the implications of size on 
profit margin will be analyzed by comparing NorgesGruppen and Ica, the largest and smallest 
market participant in terms of market share. Lastly, an analysis of the possible consequences 
of Coop’s acquisition of Ica is conducted. 
The Waterbed Effect 
KPMG (2011) gained insight into the contracts one supplier had with the different umbrella 
chains. The supplier revealed that the terms given to the largest chain were substantially 
higher than those given to the smaller chain. Furthermore, the supplier pointed out that its fear 
of losing the contract with the largest chain resulted in unreasonable discounts. This effect is 
brought up in Dobson (2005) as possibly leading to a virtuous circle, where the largest 
competitor can use it cost advantage to undercut the smaller competitors to consistently gain a 
larger market share. Inderst and Valletti (2011) formally introduced the waterbed effect, 
which was presented in section 2. To review, the waterbed effect is present when relatively 
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smaller competitors must carry the suppliers’ costs of offering the larger competitor the best 
terms and conditions. Hence, the smaller retailer will obtain worse terms and conditions at the 
same time as the larger retailer become more competitive. This implies that the smaller 
participant’s profitability will be reduced and eventually it will not be able to compete as 
efficiently. 
 
The above section analyzes the possibilities of NorgesGruppen obtaining better terms and 
conditions of trade than Ica due to its relatively larger market share. The large market share 
implies that NorgesGruppen controls a wider access to the market than Ica does. 
Consequently, we may expect that suppliers will offer NorgesGruppen better terms and 
conditions than Ica. Considering the development in the market shares of NorgesGruppen and 
Ica, cf. figure 3.4, they have also shown different trends. Whereas NorgesGruppen has 
increased its market shares since its establishment in the Norwegian market, Ica’s market 
share has declined. Compared to 2005, NorgesGruppen’s market share has increased with 7%, 
whereas Ica’s share has declined with 45%. Based on the observations in 2010, the gross 
profit margins of both firms are at the same level of about 20% in 2010. However, over the 
next years the gross profit margins of NorgesGruppen and Ica move in opposite directions 
(see figure 6.2). In isolation, this is in line with changes in market shares translating into the 
level of terms and conditions. 
 
The analysis in section 6.2.1 concludes that Ica’s terms and conditions of trade have worsened 
over the time period of 2010 to 2013. The differing trends of the two firms’ gross profit 
margins indicate that NorgesGruppen may have improved its terms on behalf of Ica. From 
section 6.2.1 we observe an increase in NorgesGruppen’s gross profit margin, but cannot 
conclude that the changes in NorgesGruppen’s margin are caused by changes in its terms. 
Consequently, we cannot conclude definitively on whether we observe the waterbed effect in 
the Norwegian grocery market. Nevertheless, there are indications found in the trend of both 
market shares and profits than strongly suggest a relationship between the competitiveness of 
the two firms. 
Coop and Ica 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
With the recent changes in the market, a concentration measure is even more relevant in 
assessing the competitiveness among the market participants. Coop’s acquisition of Ica 
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reduces the number of major market participants from four to three. Assuming that Coop will 
sustain Ica’s market share, Coop’s market share will rise to 33.8%. The following figure 6.7 
exhibits the potential new market shares should the Competition Authority approves the 
acquisition. 
 
Figure 6.7. Market shares as of 2013 and possible new market shares following the acquisition (adapted 
from Nielsen, 2014). 
 
Following the increased concentration of the market, HHI5 will rise to about 3,200, or with 
about 500 points. Hence, the HHI indicates that the acquisition theoretically reduces the 
competition in the market at the national level and as such the risks of tacit collusion and 
reduced competition increase. The effect on HHI is summarized in table 6.2. 
Table 6.2. HHI based on old and new composition of the Norwegian grocery market (based on Nielsen, 
2014). 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Please refer to section 6.3.1, question 1, for the calculations and explanation of the HHI. 
 Norges-
Gruppen 
REMA 
1000 
Coop ICA 
Bunn-
pris 
Others HHI 
Old 
composition 
39.3% 23.1% 22.7% 11.1% 3.6% 0.2% 2,730 
New 
composition 
39.3% 23.1% 33.8% 0% 3.6% 0.2% 3,234 
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Upward Pricing Pressure (UPP) 
UPP is in brief the consequences of changes in the market structure on end-consumer prices 
(Farrell & Shapiro, 2010). The index considers two effects on pricing incentives arising from 
a merger, rather than looking at concentration through measures like the HHI. Taking the 
acquisition of Ica into consideration, market competition will be reduced, allowing Coop to 
increase prices due to loss of direct competition (pressure prices upwards). However, the 
efficiency gains expected to arise from the acquisition can lower the firm’s marginal costs, 
which would counteract the increased pricing pressure (pressure prices downwards). It will be 
the net pricing pressure that will determine whether the end-consumer price will be driven 
upwards or not (Farrell & Shapiro, 2010). The effect is an important consequence of a 
reduction in the number of market participants that may reduce the competition in the market. 
The main concerns regarding the acquisition is whether the reduction in the number of actors 
will allow for tacit collusion and higher prices than before.  
 
The possible situation in the market is that it will be three more equal participants in terms of 
size. It is likely that the acquisition of Ica will increase the competitiveness of Coop compared 
to the situation today. The two umbrella chains both currently operate stores across Norway; 
however, their positions are stronger in different parts of the country (Fanebust, 2014). 
Additionally, the distribution network will most likely be more efficient due to a larger 
number of stores and an increased sales area. The CEO of Coop claims that one of the reasons 
for the acquisition was increased bargaining power. He expects the acquisition of Ica to 
further increase the competitive constellation of the market and allow Coop to be an active 
participant with regards to prices, product range and geographical reach within Norway 
(Fanebust, 2014). These statements imply that the terms and conditions of Coop are still not 
good enough, even though the above analysis has found the terms to improve relative to 2005.  
  
The price paid to acquire Ica was a high 2.8 billion SEK or 2.5 billion NOK (Ica Gruppen, 
2014a; Ekeseth & Laustsen, 2014) and Reitangruppen has stated that they intended to buy Ica 
as well (Haugdahl, 2014). These facts in combination suggest that the market participants 
consider gaining an increased market share to be important in order to become more 
competitive. Consequently, size may explain why Coop acquired Ica. Given that Ica would be 
sold regardless of Coop’s offer, the alternative was that Reitangruppen would have acquired 
Ica. This would have made Coop the smallest participant and combined with its slightly 
declining profitability the group’s situation would resemble that of Ica. Based on the analysis 
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of the waterbed effect above, Coop would then be expect to be pressured on its margins and 
would possibly have had to exit the market as well. Hence, the alternative of Coop not buying 
Ica could have proven even worse than paying an excess price. 
 
The media has claimed that this situation could be compared to “the blind buying the lame” 
(Kaspersen & Laustsen, 2014). Coop has not proven itself able to turn better terms and 
conditions of trade into an improvement of profitability in the period from 2005. 
Consequently, it will be interesting to observe the development of the retailers if the 
Competition Authority approves of the acquisition. 
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7 Conclusion 
This section provides the main conclusions of the paper and answers the research question of 
how terms and conditions of trade influence competitiveness at retail level in the Norwegian 
grocery market and discuss the implications of the findings. Section 7.2 considers the 
limitations of the paper and suggests topics for further research. 
7.1 Main Findings 
Building on the presentation of the Norwegian grocery retail market in section 3 the paper 
concludes that the competition is characterized as an oligopoly with price competition and 
geographically differentiated products. The implications are that the market participants are 
affected by and react to each other’s actions. Consequently, we would expect that the relative 
level of terms and conditions between the market participants will influence the relative 
competitiveness of the firms. 
 
Section 6.1 analyzes the finding of different reports conducted over the last years to derive at 
which terms and conditions that are used in the Norwegian grocery market. The contracts 
between suppliers and retailers are found to be regulating three variables: the unit price of the 
products, the discounts directly related to the product and other bonuses irrespective of the 
product. Thus, it can be concluded that we observe the use of flexible contracts, hence vertical 
restraints. The main vertical restraints used are found to be collected under a so-called joint 
marketing package, consisting of listing fees, joint marketing activities conducted by the 
retailers and slotting allowances.  
 
The propositions in regards to the research question are that differences in terms and 
conditions of trade influence the competitiveness (with the main focus on profitability) in the 
market, meaning that the different market participants are expected to have different 
profitability dependent on which terms and conditions of trade that they are able to obtain. We 
do not know at which level any of the market participants were at in the beginning of the time 
period or which level they are at today. However, previously conducted research suggests that 
NorgesGruppen has the most favorable terms, followed by Rema and Coop and lastly Ica.  
 
The margin analysis conducted in section 6.2 concludes that Ica has worse terms and 
conditions of trade in 2013 relative to the base year of 2010, but the firm is also running its 
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operations less efficiently. Due to that cost of goods sold constitute the major part of total 
costs, this can imply that poor terms and conditions may make it more difficult to compete in 
the market. On the other hand, Coop is found to have improved its terms and conditions in 
2013 relative to 2005 but the firm has not been able to transfer these improvements to an 
enhancement of profit margin, which shows that better terms and conditions alone are not 
enough to improve competitiveness.  
 
Reitangruppen is also found to have worse terms and conditions of trade in 2013 relative to 
2005. The firm has still increased its operating profitability over the same time period, as seen 
through the increase in its operating profit margin. The operating profit margin of 
Reitangruppen is also the highest among the four participants for almost the entire period 
investigated. NorgesGruppen’s change in gross profit margin and prices do not give any 
indications on changes in terms and conditions of trade. We do however find that the firm in 
2013 has increased its operating profit margin relative to 2005, indicating that either terms 
and conditions has improved or that the firm is operating more efficiently. 
 
The extent to which vertical restraints can be imposed on suppliers is found to depend on the 
relative bargain power of the retailers over suppliers. Consequently, the concept of buyer 
power is analyzed in section 6.3 to determine the extent of retail buyer power in general, but 
also to analyze if there are any differences in the relative buyer power of the market 
participants.  
 
The paper concludes that there is buyer power present at the retail level in the Norwegian 
grocery market. An asymmetric buyer power between the market participants is expected as 
well. The asymmetry is analyzed with regard to differences in market shares, the use of 
private labels and vertical integration with and investments in suppliers. The paper could not 
find any correlation between the use of vertical integration and improvement in terms and 
conditions of trade. With regards to private label introduction, the improvement in terms and 
conditions of trade in Coop in isolation suggests that private labels introductions increase the 
possibility of obtaining better terms, whereas Reitangruppen’s worsening counteracts this 
conclusion. 
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To sum it up, the changes in gross profit margin and terms and conditions of trade of the four 
market participants have differed and have also translated differently into operating profit 
margin, which is the indicator of profitability and competitiveness.  
 
We would expect that improved (worsened) terms and conditions would increase (decrease) 
gross profit margin and also lead to increased (decreased) operating profit margins. With 
regards to Ica, this is the case. This observation suggests that terms and conditions of trade 
greatly impact the competitiveness of individual firms in the Norwegian grocery market. 
However, we observe that both Coop and Reitangruppen experience different effects, 
respectively better terms and conditions and decreasing operating profit margin and worse 
terms and conditions but increasing operating profit margin. Previous research implies that 
both Reitangruppen’s and Coop’s terms and conditions of trade are located somewhere 
between the two extremes of NorgesGruppen and Ica, but that their terms are roughly the 
same. Hence, it can be concluded that there are also other factors in addition to changes in 
terms and conditions that influence competitiveness.  
 
As shown in this paper, Ica’s statement that their terms and conditions of trade make it 
impossible for them to compete in the Norwegian market is only true to a certain extent. Their 
worsened terms and conditions of trade makes it harder for them to compete, but as exhibited 
by Reitangruppen it is possible to experience a worsening of the terms and conditions of trade 
but still improve operating profit margin, thus improving competitiveness.  
Implications of Findings 
An interesting observation is that Coop has improved its terms and conditions of trade but is 
still not able to be more competitive in the market, neither increasing its operating profit 
margin nor its market share. Still, the firm acquires Ica to improve its bargaining power and 
obtain better terms and conditions. Based on the observations in this paper, Coop already has 
problems with the efficiency of its operations and Ica has had even greater difficulties in 
succeeding, as the firm has been struggling with both poor margins and efficiency. As Coop 
previously has not shown itself able to turn the improvements in terms and conditions into 
profitability it will be interesting to observe whether their increase in size will allow them to 
obtain even better terms and if they are actually able to turn the trend around. It must be noted 
that an increased number of stores and sales area may also contribute to increased economies 
of scale for the firm. As such they may be able to improve efficiency due to this. Lastly, it is 
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important to consider that even though it does not seem optimal for Coop to acquire Ica, to 
not acquire them might have been worse. 
7.2 Limitations and Suggestions of Further Research 
The main limitation of investing the topic of this paper is the availability of data to 
researchers. Prices paid to suppliers and terms and conditions of contracts are generally 
considered sensitive information and the only information available to the public are found 
through financial statements. However, the importance of the industry to Norwegian 
consumers implies that more information should be available, as it will allow for a more open 
discussion of how the situation is in the market. Gabrielsen (2010) also asserts that 
transparency in the market in regards to information on prices, quality and service level is 
needed for improved effectiveness of the competition between the market participants. With 
access to these factors, consumers can take better-informed choices and stimulate the 
horizontal competition between the chains, which in turn can influence the prices and product 
range that Norwegian customers are faced with. 
 
As such, further investigation is suggested on the topic of this paper through gaining inside 
information on (one of) the market participants and as such improve the understanding of the 
market. Based on the implications of the findings in this paper, another topic of research is 
Coop’s acquisition of Ica and the backgrounds for why “the blind buys the lame”, as it has 
been expressed in Norwegian media.  
 
Another topic for further investigation is that of margins on different products, in particular 
the difference on private label products and branded products from powerful suppliers to 
further analyze how the grocery retailers can improve their competitiveness.  
 
This paper has also touched upon the subject of the retailers’ exploitation of suppliers by 
using buyer power. This paper concludes with the existence of buyer power among the 
grocery retailers but cannot find any indications of particularly high margins at retail level. A 
topic for further investigation is how the terms and conditions of trade that retailers are able to 
obtain affect suppliers and the margin at the upstream level in the supply chain. The upstream 
market is however characterized by a wide range of product categories, with differing 
importance and competition. As such, the effects of buyer power are suggested to be 
investigated within certain categories. 
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Appendix A - List of Products Included in the Price Comparisons 
Products 
1. Milk (Tine) 
2. Sour cream (Tine) 
3. Mackerel in tomato sauce (Stabburet) 
4. Caviar (Mills) 
5. Tomato soup (Toro) 
6. Flour 
7. Rice (Uncle Ben’s) 
8. Eggs 
9. Ketchup (Idun – Stabburet) 
10. Sun Extra Power (refill – Lilleborg) 
11. Pilsner beer – canned (Ringnes) 
12. Chips – Classic salt (Maarud) 
13. Bananas 
14. Apples 
15. Tomatoes 
 
Chains from which the Prices are Collected 
Ica 
1. Ica: Ica Supermarked / Ica Nær 
2. Rimi 
 
Coop 
1. Coop Mega 
2. Coop Obs! (not for 2012 and 2013) 
3. Coop Prix 
 
Reitangruppen 
1. REMA 1000 
 
NorgesGruppen 
1. Kiwi 
2. Meny 
3. Spar 
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Appendix B – Price Comparisons 
 
Ica 
 
ICA 2005 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013 
Milk              9,6              10,7              11,8              14,5              14,9             34,8  
Sour cream             13,9              13,9              15,4              15,9              16,9             16,5  
Mackerel in tomato sauce             10,4              12,5              14,9              17,9              16,9             12,9  
Caviar             22,3              19,4              19,9              22,9              22,9             22,9  
Tomato soup             11,9              10,0                14,5             18,9  
Flour              7,0                7,0               16,5              11,9             11,9  
Rice             12,4                8,0              33,6              12,5              29,5             27,9  
Egg             26,8             27,8                37,9             33,9  
Ketchup             11,5              10,5               14,9              16,5             16,2  
Sun Extra Power             27,9              18,3               38,9              33,9             37,5  
Pilsner beer             23,5              22,9              20,5              22,9              24,5             24,9  
Chips             11,6              13,5              14,2              25,9              24,9             27,9  
Bananas              9,9                8,9              17,9              17,5                9,9             14,9  
Apples             10,0              17,4              17,9                9,8              12,9             20,0  
Tomatoes             20,0              17,9              19,9              29,3              24,9             24,9  
SUM           228,6            218,6            186,0            259,4            312,9            346,0  
              
 
 
Rimi 2005 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013 
Milk              9,6              10,2              11,9              13,8              13,8             36,3  
Sour cream             13,9              12,5              14,6              14,9              14,6             15,9  
Mackerel in tomato sauce             10,0              12,0              14,0              16,8              16,7             12,5  
Caviar             22,3              18,5              19,5              20,4              22,2             21,2  
Tomato soup             11,5              10,0              11,5              16,9              15,6             19,2  
Flour              6,4                6,5                7,0              11,3              11,6             11,4  
Rice              9,9              10,0              33,8              29,2              27,9             26,7  
Egg             23,0             22,0              19,0              19,2              32,9             33,6  
Ketchup             11,5                8,7              12,0              13,8              15,4             14,8  
Sun Extra Power             25,8              16,6              26,7              26,9              32,5             35,7  
Pilsner beer             22,5              22,0              20,5              20,5              23,9             23,9  
Chips             13,3              12,1              13,6              16,1              25,1             26,7  
Bananas              9,9                9,0                8,5              13,9              10,9               7,7  
Apples             17,5              14,0                9,5                8,5                7,8             10,4  
Tomatoes             29,5              18,0              20,0              22,9              24,9             18,7  
SUM           236,5            202,1            242,0            265,1            295,8            314,7  
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ICA Average 2005 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013 
Milk              9,6              10,5              11,9  14,2             14,4             35,5  
Sour cream             13,9              13,2              15,0  15,4             15,8             16,2  
Mackerel in tomato sauce             10,2              12,3              14,5  17,4             16,8             12,7  
Caviar             22,3              18,9              19,7  21,7             22,6             22,1  
Tomato soup             11,7              10,0              11,5  16,9             15,1             19,1  
Flour              6,7                6,7                7,0  13,9             11,8             11,7  
Rice             11,2                9,0              33,7  20,9             28,7             27,3  
Egg             24,9              24,9              19,0  19,2             35,4             33,8  
Ketchup             11,5                9,6              12,0  14,4             16,0             15,5  
Sun Extra Power             26,8              17,4              26,7  32,9             33,2             36,6  
Pilsner beer             23,0              22,5              20,5  21,7             24,2             24,4  
Chips             12,4              12,8              13,9  21,0             25,0             27,3  
Bananas              9,9                9,0              13,2  15,7             10,4             11,3  
Apples             13,8              15,7              13,7  9,2             10,4             15,2  
Tomatoes             24,8              18,0              20,0  26,1             24,9             21,8  
SUM           232,5            210,4            252,1  280,3           304,4            330,3  
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Coop 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coop Obs! 2005 2006 2008 2010 
Milk             9,6            10,4            11,0            13,8  
Sour cream           12,9            13,3            13,5            14,8  
Mackerel in tomato sauce           10,4            11,2            12,9            16,8  
Caviar           19,9            19,8            20,4            20,9  
Tomato soup           10,5            10,4            12,2            10,3  
Flour             7,2              6,5              7,2            11,5  
Rice           10,9              9,9             29,4  
Egg           18,9           26,4            21,3   
Ketchup             9,2              8,7            12,4            13,9  
Sun Extra Power           19,2            16,6            28,5            27,2  
Pilsner beer           19,9            20,0             21,2  
Chips           12,4             13,5            14,9  
Bananas           14,9              9,9             9,9            10,9  
Apples             9,9             16,9            19,9  
Tomatoes           29,9           16,9            16,9            24,9  
SUM           215,7            179,9            196,5            250,4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coop Mega 2005 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013 
Milk             9,8            10,6            12,2            13,8            13,4            15,7  
Sour cream           13,4            13,5            14,8            16,2            15,9            14,9  
Mackerel in tomato sauce             9,5            12,9            14,9            17,9            18,2            13,6  
Caviar           20,5            20,4            20,9            22,9            24,2            23,2  
Tomato soup           10,8            10,9            12,9            18,8            14,7            20,5  
Flour           11,5              6,9              7,8            12,9            13,9            12,5  
Rice           10,8            13,0             32,5            31,9            30,5  
Egg           19,7            27,9            21,4             43,5            36,9  
Ketchup           10,5              9,2            13,0            14,9            16,8            16,3  
Sun Extra Power           23,5            17,0            31,2            29,9            36,0            27,7  
Pilsner beer           20,5            20,9             23,2            25,0            25,9  
Chips           13,2            13,5            14,9            17,8            27,2            29,5  
Bananas           16,9            10,9            10,1            10,0            18,9            13,9  
Apples           14,9            14,9            10,7            14,9            24,9            13,9  
Tomatoes           34,9            14,9            29,9            29,9            27,9            21,9  
SUM           240,4            217,3            214,8            275,6            352,4            316,8  
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Coop Prix 2005 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013 
Milk             9,5            10,4            18,7            13,8            13,8            14,3  
Sour cream           12,9            13,3            14,4            14,8            14,6            15,9  
Mackerel in tomato sauce           10,4            11,2            12,9            16,8            16,9            12,5  
Caviar           19,9            19,8            20,5            20,9            22,5            21,2  
Tomato soup           10,4            10,4            12,2            17,2            14,6            18,7  
Flour             6,5              6,5              7,2            11,5            12,2            11,4  
Rice           10,9              9,9            40,4            29,4            27,9            26,7  
Egg           18,9           26,4            20,7            19,2            40,6            17,9  
Ketchup             9,2              8,7            12,0            13,9            15,5            15,0  
Sun Extra Power           17,4            16,6            28,5            27,2            32,9            35,7  
Pilsner beer           19,9            20,0            19,0            21,2            23,9            23,9  
Chips           12,4            12,5            13,5            16,4            25,8            16,4  
Bananas           14,9              9,9            12,9            10,9              9,9             9,9  
Apples             9,9            14,9            16,9              9,9            21,9            10,9  
Tomatoes           24,9            12,9            29,9            24,9            25,9            18,9  
SUM           208,0            203,3            279,6            268,0            318,9            269,3  
Coop Average 2005 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013 
Milk              9,6              10,5              14,0              13,8              13,6             15,0  
Sour cream             13,1              13,4              14,2              15,3              15,3             15,4  
Mackerel in tomato sauce             10,1              11,8              13,6              17,2              17,6             13,1  
Caviar             20,1              20,0              20,6              21,6              23,4             22,2  
Tomato soup             10,6              10,6              12,4              15,4              14,7             19,6  
Flour              8,4                6,6                7,4              12,0              13,1             12,0  
Rice             10,9              10,9              40,4              30,4              29,9             28,6  
Egg             19,2              26,9              21,1              19,2              42,1             27,4  
Ketchup              9,6                8,8              12,5              14,2              16,2             15,6  
Sun Extra Power             20,0              16,7              29,4              28,1              34,5             31,7  
Pilsner beer             20,1              20,3              19,0              21,9              24,5             24,9  
Chips             12,7              13,0              14,0              16,3              26,5             23,0  
Bananas             15,6              10,2              11,0              10,6              14,4             11,9  
Apples             11,6              14,9              14,8              14,9              23,4             12,4  
Tomatoes             29,9              14,9              25,6              26,6              26,9             20,4  
SUM           221,3            209,5            269,9            277,4            335,7            293,1  
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Reitangruppen 
 
REMA 1000 2005 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013 
Milk             9,5            10,0            11,2           13,4            13,8            13,9  
Sour cream           12,0            13,5            14,3            14,9            14,6            15,9  
Mackerel in tomato sauce             9,0            11,0            12,9            16,8            16,7            12,5  
Caviar           19,0            20,0            19,4            20,4            22,0            21,2  
Tomato soup           10,0            10,0            11,8            12,7            12,7            18,0  
Flour             6,5              6,5              7,0            11,3            11,6            11,4  
Rice             8,0              8,0            31,3            28,9            27,8            26,7  
Egg           19,0           19,0            18,3            19,2            32,8            33,6  
Ketchup             8,7              8,7            12,0            13,8            15,4            14,8  
Sun Extra Power           16,6            16,6            28,1            26,6            32,1            35,7  
Pilsner beer           22,5            20,0            19,9            20,5            23,8            23,9  
Chips           11,7            10,6            13,2            16,0            23,9            16,4  
Bananas           11,0            10,0            14,0            10,5              9,9             7,7  
Apples           12,0            19,9            13,0              9,0            16,9            10,4  
Tomatoes           28,0            12,0            19,0            26,5            13,5            14,9  
SUM         203,4           195,7           245,3           260,5           287,5          276,9 
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NorgesGruppen 
 
 
 
 
 
Meny 2005 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013 
Milk              9,6              10,7              12,2              13,8              14,9             15,5  
Sour cream             13,4              13,3              14,7              15,9              16,9             16,9  
Mackerel in tomato sauce              9,9              11,9              14,9              17,9              16,9             12,9  
Caviar             20,3              19,8              19,9              22,9              22,9             21,9  
Tomato soup             11,9              10,2              13,9              17,9              18,5             18,9  
Flour              6,5                6,6                5,8              11,9              11,9             11,9  
Rice             14,0                9,9              39,9              31,9              29,5             27,9  
Egg             19,7             20,3              26,9              25,9              35,9             34,9  
Ketchup             10,0                9,3              13,0              14,9              16,5             16,2  
Sun Extra Power             27,7              18,0              29,4              29,9              33,9             37,5  
Pilsner beer             22,9              22,0              21,9              22,9              24,5             24,9  
Chips             12,8              13,6              14,9              24,9              24,9             27,9  
Bananas             13,9                9,9                9,9              10,9                9,9             12,9  
Apples             13,8              12,9              15,9              14,9                9,9               8,9  
Tomatoes             29,9              19,9              24,9              29,9              24,9             14,9  
SUM           236,4            208,2            278,1            306,4            311,9            304,0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kiwi 2005 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013 
Milk              9,5              10,3              10,7              13,8              13,8             13,9  
Sour cream             12,9              12,9              13,6              14,0              14,6             15,9  
Mackerel in tomato sauce             10,9              10,9              12,9              16,9              16,7             12,5  
Caviar             19,7              19,4              19,9              20,4              22,4             21,2  
Tomato soup              9,8              10,0              11,9              16,9              13,9             18,9  
Flour              6,4                6,5                6,5              11,4              11,9             11,4  
Rice             13,9                7,9              34,9              29,9              28,9             26,9  
Egg             19,7             19,9              18,6              18,5              33,9             33,7  
Ketchup              9,4                8,6              12,4              13,9              15,9             15,6  
Sun Extra Power             16,5              16,5              27,5              26,9              32,4             35,9  
Pilsner beer             21,9              19,9              19,9              20,9              23,9             23,9  
Chips             12,3              12,4              14,2              16,4              23,9             26,9  
Bananas              9,9                9,9                8,7              10,4                9,9               7,7  
Apples             13,9              13,9              13,1                8,3              15,0             13,0  
Tomatoes             29,9              19,9              23,6              22,7              13,0             14,8  
SUM           216,7            198,9            248,4            261,2            290,0            292,1  
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Spar 2005 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013 
Milk              9,8              10,7              12,2              13,8              14,5             14,9  
Sour cream             13,8              14,2              14,5              16,5              15,5             16,9  
Mackerel in tomato sauce             10,9              13,2              13,9              13,9              17,9             12,9  
Caviar             21,3              20,7              21,9              22,9              23,5             22,5  
Tomato soup             11,8              11,2               18,9              19,5  
Flour              5,7                6,7               13,5              12,5             11,9  
Rice             13,9              13,9              43,6              31,5              29,5             27,9  
Egg             20,7             21,5                35,5             39,9  
Ketchup             10,4              10,8               14,9              16,5             16,6  
Sun Extra Power             27,8              18,3               32,9              33,9             37,9  
Pilsner beer             23,7              22,9               22,5              24,9             24,9  
Chips             13,2               14,2              18,5              26,9             28,5  
Bananas             11,5              10,0              12,9              14,9                6,9               9,9  
Apples             14,9               16,9              19,9              12,9             11,9  
Tomatoes             26,9              16,9              18,8              24,9              24,9             16,9  
SUM           236,3            191,0            169,0            279,5            295,8            313,0  
 
 
 
 
NorgesGruppen Average 2005 2006 2008 2010 2012 2013 
Milk              9,6              10,6  11,7             13,8              14,4             14,8  
Sour cream             13,4              13,5  14,3             15,5              15,7             16,6  
Mackerel in tomato sauce             10,6              12,0  13,9             16,2              17,2             12,8  
Caviar             20,4              20,0  20,6             22,1              22,9             21,9  
Tomato soup             11,2              10,5  12,9             17,9              16,2             19,1  
Flour              6,2                6,6  6,1             12,3              12,1             11,7  
Rice             13,9              10,6  39,5             31,1              29,3             27,6  
Egg             20,0              20,6  22,8             22,2              35,1             36,2  
Ketchup             10,0                9,6  12,7             14,6              16,3             16,1  
Sun Extra Power             24,0              17,6  28,5             29,9              33,4             37,1  
Pilsner beer             22,8              21,6  20,9             22,1              24,4             24,6  
Chips             12,8              13,0  14,4             19,9              25,2             27,8  
Bananas             11,8                9,9  10,5             12,1                8,9             10,2  
Apples             14,2              13,4  15,3             14,4              12,6             11,3  
Tomatoes             28,9              18,9  22,4             25,8              20,9             15,5  
SUM           229,8            208,2            266,4            289,8            304,6            303,0  
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Appendix C – Excerpts from the Financial Reports 
 
Ica Norge 
 
Ica 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Sales revenue     10 418      10 645      10 549      10 777      17 098      17 107      17 240      15 718      14 167  
Other operating revenue          654           365           301           336        1 367        1 546        1 761        1 595        1 521  
Sum operating revenue     11 072      11 009      10 850      11 113      18 465      18 653      19 002      17 314      15 688  
Cost of goods sold       9 326        9 426        9 240        9 589      13 650      13 848      14 226      12 983      11 803  
Other operating expenses       1 383        1 383        1 485        1 640        5 309        5 362        5 405        5 163        4 736  
Sum operating expenses     10 709      10 809      10 725      11 229      18 959      19 211      19 631      18 146      16 539  
                  
 Gross profit       1 092        1 219        1 310        1 188        3 448        3 259        3 014        2 736        2 364  
Operating profit          363           201           125  -        116  -        494  -        558  -        629  -        832  -        851  
 
Ica Norge – from the Swedish financial reports before the joint venture 
 
 
 
 
Coop 
 
Coop 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Sales revenue     18 677      21 212      23 201      24 071      27 468      28 065      28 785      29 711      30 126  
Other operating revenue          331           324           305        2 110        1 194        1 223        1 256        1 285        1 342  
Sum operating revenue     19 008      21 536      23 506      26 181      28 662      29 288      30 041      30 996      31 468  
Cost of goods sold     17 446      19 978      21 843      23 371      24 886      25 379      26 027      26 816      27 410  
Other operating expenses       1 519        1 517        2 036        2 553        3 620        3 608        3 614        4 014        4 002  
Sum operating expenses     18 965      21 495      23 879      25 924      28 506      28 987      29 641      30 830      31 412  
                
 
  
Gross profit       1 231        1 234        1 358           700        2 582        2 686        2 758        2 895        2 716  
Operating profit            43             41  -        373           257           156           301           400           166             56  
 
 
ICA 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Sales SEK  19 039   18 359   19 095   20 293   21 666  
Operating profit  534   89   127  -520  -506  
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Reitangruppen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NorgesGruppen 
 
 
Reitangruppen 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Sales revenue     16 452      20 202      30 385      40 714      40 585      41 435      46 119      53 241      58 185  
Other operating revenue            27           404        1 117             80           305           600           472           501           772  
Sum operating revenue     16 479      20 606      31 502      40 794      40 890      42 035      46 591      53 742      58 957  
Cost of goods sold     12 322      15 359      23 692      33 106      31 478      32 076      36 151      42 045      45 748  
Other operating expenses       3 404        3 996        5 508        7 028        7 600        7 731        8 266        9 119      10 168  
Sum operating expenses     15 726      19 355      29 200      40 134      39 078      39 807      44 417      51 164      55 916  
                
 
  
Gross profit       4 130        4 843        6 693        7 608        9 107        9 359        9 968      11 196      12 437  
Operating profit          753        1 251        2 302           660        1 812        2 228        2 174        2 578        3 041  
NorgesGruppen 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Sales revenue     30 366      35 348      41 057      47 047      51 078      53 411      56 031      59 409      64 592  
Other operating revenue       1 165        1 283        1 621        1 968        2 154        2 264        2 610        2 674        2 803  
Sum operating revenue     31 531      36 632      42 678      49 016      53 232      55 675      58 641      62 083      67 396  
Cost of goods sold     24 109      28 410      33 090      38 016      40 921      42 621      44 237      45 456      49 610  
Other operating expenses       6 509        7 120        8 179        9 796      10 483      10 949      11 945      14 055      15 512  
Sum operating expenses     30 618      35 529      41 269      47 812      51 404      53 570      56 182      59 511      65 122  
                  
 Gross profit       6 257        6 938        7 967        9 031      10 157      10 790      11 794      13 953      14 982  
Operating profit          913        1 102        1 409        1 204        1 828        2 105        2 459        2 572        2 274  
